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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I examine the role social development plays in the successes and 
failures of Washington Consensus–type neoliberal economic growth strategies 
throughout Latin America, as well as the effects of growth on levels of political 
violence in the region.  I also analyze the role of targeted social spending in 
legitimizing the implementation of structural adjustment programs across all 
regime types.  Finally, I use a discriminate analysis to divide the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean into two distinct geographic and economic 
subregions where separate development strategies can be optimized.  
I perform a Varimax rotated factor analysis on the universe of data and on 
two subregions to determine those prospective constraints most closely 
associated with growth potential throughout Latin America.  Next, I perform an 
Ordinary Least Squares regression on 17 Latin American and Caribbean 
Countries (1970–2000) to determine the influence of targeted social spending on 
the implementation of structural adjustment programs and another to determine 
the influence of economic growth and inequality on levels of political violence in 
Latin America (1996–2008).  Finally, I use a discriminate analysis to challenge 
the World Economic Forum classifications of several Latin American countries, 
therefore providing better targeted development strategy recommendations in 
each. 
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I. BACKGROUND ON POST WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARRIBEAN  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Latin America and the Caribbean is one of six geographical areas included 
in the World Bank’s list of developing regions.1  Unfortunately, lumping all of  
the diverse countries of Latin America and the Caribbean together for the 
purposes of development has led to development strategies that may have been 
correct for some countries, but were proclaimed the answer to the development 
question in all.  This was particularly the case under the guise of the “Washington 
Consensus” during the late 1980s and through the 1990s.  The neoliberal 
approach of the Washington Consensus argued that social spending has a 
negative impact on economic growth and that a country must minimize social 
expenditures to remain competitive in a globalized economy.  In Latin America, 
the poster child for Washington Consensus growth strategies was Chile and the 
rapid growth experienced there during the authoritarian regime of President 
Augusto Pinochet.  The influence of the Chilean growth model on strategies 
implemented elsewhere in Latin America cannot be overstated, but in many 
cases, the neoliberal model failed to achieve the desired results.  Why was this 
so?  Why did the orthodox neoliberal model have success in some parts of Latin 
America, why it has been a dismal failure in others, and what role did social 
development play in these successes and failures?   
This question is very straightforward and yet it raises additional questions 
that need to be addressed in order to answer it fully and place it within the proper 
context.  First, what role did social spending play in allowing both democratic and 
authoritarian governments to successfully implement economic reforms?  Were 
the economic policies implemented by the various regime types all orthodox 
                                            
1 The other World Bank Developing Regions are:  Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe 
and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. 
 2 
reforms, or was there variation in the policy enactment that could account for  
the variation in the popular response?  What influence did external factors have 
on internal strategies for reform implementation?  Second, what were the 
unintended consequences of orthodox neoliberal reform strategies and what  
role did economic growth combined with decreased social spending play in 
increased inequality and violence in Latin America? Third, what role can social 
development play in building post–Washington Consensus pro-growth strategies 
that promote growth within a country’s current stage of development and 
establish the necessary prerequisites to move a country to the next stage?  
Finally, can Latin America and the Caribbean be geographically and 
economically separated into subregions that produce better development policy 
recommendations to maximize the growth potential of individual countries—
moving beyond a one-size fits all Washington Consensus type approach?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
Dani Rodrik’s recent and highly influential book, One Economics – Many 
Recipes, seems to challenge the neoliberal free market ideals that have been 
pervasive in the realm of development economics since John Williamson coined 
the phrase “Washington Consensus” in 1990.2  Rodrik primarily uses the rampant 
successes of the Asian Tigers to demonstrate how the functions that good 
institutions perform do not necessarily require a specific form of those institutions 
to work.  In other words, as long as the institutions are able to accomplish their 
goals, it doesn’t really matter what shape they take or how they are implemented.  
Rodrik’s approach is incomplete however, as he tends to focus on cases where 
there was growth without the Washington Consensus (as in Asia) and overlook 
cases where the Washington Consensuses has worked—especially in some 
Latin American countries.  Additionally, Rodrik disregards positive cases where 
there was growth in Latin America without a strict adherence to Washington 
                                            
2 John Williamson and Institute for International Economics (U.S.), Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much has Happened? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 
1990). 
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Consensus principles.3  Finally, Rodrik fails to analyze the role of social spending 
and social development in both promoting economic growth and facilitating 
structural adjustment programs. 
A better understanding of which portions of orthodox neoliberal 
development strategies are most necessary for growth is vital if scarce 
government funds are to be spent in the most efficient way for promoting growth 
and development.  Further, different growth strategies may be more effective 
depending on where a country lies on their growth trajectory.  For example, 
poorer countries may receive a higher return on their investment by focusing on 
particular areas such as infrastructure building than a wealthier country would.  
Additionally, challenging the neoliberal assumption that social spending has a 
negative impact on economic growth is vital to fully appreciating the complexities 
of the Latin American case.  Finally, a non-U.S.-centric repackaging of the 
strategy is required to make growth initiatives more desirable for developing 
economies.  Specifically, the term “Washington Consensus” has done little to 
promote its use, as the developing world has been resistant to adopt strategies 
seen as dictated by the “imperialist north.”4  However, before a restructuring of 
development packages can be accomplished, the vital portions of what is already 
in place and the role of social development in promoting economic growth, 
easing the implementation of structural adjustment programs, and minimizing the 
threat of violence must be determined and evaluated. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The Washington Consensus has not been nearly as successful at 
promoting economic development and growth as was originally promised to 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.  As these states have become 
more democratic, the political costs of implementing a full Washington 
                                            
3 Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic 
Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
4 Josef Joffe, Uberpower: The Imperial Temptation of America (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 2006). 
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Consensus regime has become nearly untenable for domestic leadership, and 
many have turned to alternate growth strategies that are not as politically 
unpopular.  Without a reassessment and restructuring of the prescribed growth 
policies espoused by Washington and most international development 
organizations, the West potentially stands to lose desired influence in the 
developing states.  In an increasingly globalized world, it is in the interest of all 
states to promote growth and development, and while this does not mean a 
complete abandonment of neoliberal economic policies, it does mean a return to 
economic first principles and a pragmatic approach to growth strategy 
implementation with a renewed focus on social development. 
I define social development or social change as moving in the direction of 
achieving the goals of the United Nations’ Declaration on Social Progress and 
Development of 1969.5  This differs from economic development in that 
economic development considers growth but does not consider distribution of the 
fruits of that growth.  Social development then is progress towards the elimination 
of poverty through methods that ensure greater equity and rights throughout the 
population.  I also focus on the use of targeted social spending, which I define as 
any social spending that is not broad based in its application.  For example, 
education and health programs that are targeted to those most in need and are 
not broadly applied to the entire population would be considered targeted social 
spending. 
Hypothesis1:  Targeted social spending and social development has 
played a central role in both the implementation and success of orthodox 
neoliberal reforms throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.  Social spending 
eased the political costs of structural adjustment and separately played a central 
role in actually achieving growth. 
 
                                            
5 Declaration on Social Progress and Development, UN Resolution 2542 (11 Dec. 1969): 1–
27. 
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Hypothesis2:  All governments, regardless of regime type, had to make 
concessions to their populations during periods of economic reform, but 
democratic regimes were better able to negotiate and thus implemented more 
orthodox type reforms. 
Hypothesis3:  In Latin America, controlling for sudden economic shocks, 
levels of democracy, population levels, globalization, and democratization—there 
is an increase in incidence of political violence during periods of economic 
growth, high unemployment, greater income inequality, and low levels of voice 
and accountability for the majority of the population. 
Hypothesis4:  Although a focus on targeted social spending and social 
development will help all countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, other 
areas of focus will help countries more or less depending on their current level of 
development. 
Hypothesis5:  The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean can be 
divided into two distinct geographic and economic subregions, and separate 
development strategies can be optimized to promote the most growth for each 
subregion at the lowest cost to the government. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Building on the inductive approach of Hirschman, Gerschenkron, and 
Rostow6, Dani Rodrik finds that what matters most when it comes to economic 
growth and development is function not form, namely a return to economic first 
principles.  For Rodrik the most important thing to help foster economic 
development is to find ways to build on economic first principles no matter what 
form those implementations take.  Rodrik examines the strong development and 
growth in Asia over the last several decades and finds that they were able to 
                                            
6 Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1958); Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, a 
Book of Essays (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962); W. W. Rostow, 
The Stages of Economic Growth, a Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge England: University 
Press, 1960). 
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achieve rapid growth without using the usually prescribed methods of the 
Washington Consensus.  Table 1 lists Rodrik’s economic first principles. 
 
1. Protection of Property Rights 4. Appropriate Incentives 
2. Contract Enforcement 5. Sound Money 
3. Market-based Competition 6. Debt Sustainability 
Table 1.   Economic First Principles7 
Rodrik argues that an individualized country-specific approach to 
development is required to ensure success, and many others have followed in 
this line of thinking.8  The problem for Rodrik is that his analysis seems to neglect 
places where the Washington Consensus has worked and place too heavy of an 
emphasis on the East Asian development model.  By ignoring other growth 
strategies, many of which have been rejected because of their long-term viability 
(such as Import Substitution Industrialization), Rodrik leaves out a breadth of 
strategies that have also been shown to work in the past, at least for getting 
industrialization and growth started in the first place.   
John Williamson’s original Washington Consensus identifies ten policy 
instruments about which there is a reasonable consensus in Washington.  
Williamson’s Washington is both the political Washington of Congress and the 
technocratic Washington of international financial institutions, the Federal 
Reserve, and the think tanks.9  The left side of Table 2 lays out these ten policy 
recommendations as originally proposed by Williamson and the right side 
includes the ten additional policy recommendations integrated into Rodrik’s 
“Augmented” Washington Consensus. Even with these twenty policy 
                                            
7 Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes, 15. 
8 José Antonio Ocampo, “Beyond the Washington Consensus: What do we Mean?” Journal 
of Post Keynesian Economics 27, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 293–314; Daniel Kaufmann et al., “Growth 
without Governance [with Comments],” Economía 3, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 169–229; John 
Williamson, “The Washington Consensus and Beyond,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no. 15 
(Apr. 2003): 1475–1481; Joseph E. Stiglitz and Lyn Squire, “International Development: Is it 
Possible?” Foreign Policy, no. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring 1998): 138–
151. 
9 Williamson and Institute for International Economics (U.S.), Latin American Adjustment: 
How Much has Happened?, 2. 
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recommendations, several key determinants of economic growth are 




 “Augmented Washington Consensus”
11
 
1. Fiscal discipline 11. Corporate governance 
2. Reorientation of public expenditures 12. Anticorruption 
3. Tax reform 13. Flexible labor markets 
4. Interest rate liberalization 14. Adherence to WTO disciplines 
5. Competitive exchange rates 15. Adherence to international financial codes 
and standards 
6. Trade liberalization 16. Prudent capital-account opening 
7. Openness to direct foreign investment 17. Nonintermediate exchange rate regimes 
8. Privatization 18. Independent central banks/inflation 
targeting 
9. Deregulation 19. Social safety nets 
10. Secure property rights 20. Targeted poverty reduction 
Table 2.   Washington Consensus 
Determinants of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth are continuously a 
source of debate within the literature, but a general consensus exists as to which 
key determinates to examine to add to the depth of knowledge on this topic.  
Neoclassical economists tend to focus on labor and capital and the factors which 
impact their availability and productivity, Keynesians look at government and 
private spending and investment, and Monetarists concentrate on the money 
supply and inflation.  Somewhere within this conglomeration of ideas most likely 
lies the answers, but debate will continue for the foreseeable future.  Regardless 
of their impact in the positive or negative direction, the review that follows 
highlights why these factors are at least worth examination with regards to 
Washington Consensus effectiveness. 
Degregorio finds foreign direct investment (FDI) to have a positive impact 
on GDP growth and on output itself due to the increased availability of capital, 
particularly when labor is underutilized.12  Kosack, on the other hand, finds FDI to 
                                            
10 Ibid., 20. 
11 Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes, 17. 
12 José De Gregorio, “Economic Growth in Latin America,” Journal of Development 
Economics 39, no. 1 (Jul. 1992): 59–84. 
 8 
have a negligible if not slightly negative impact on GDP growth and a negligible 
impact on GDP.  The negative influence is found to come from the crowding out 
of local public and private investment with FDI.13  In Latin America, labor has 
been historically underutilized, and local public and private investment could 
have been crowded out especially during times of fiscal limitation based on the 
debt restructuring. 
Fisher and Lucas find that the rate of inflation also has a real impact on 
growth and output.14 However, there is also a consensus that it is actually the 
expectation of inflation that impacts growth.15  Further, Fatas finds that output 
stability is affected by the reputation of the central bank in fighting inflation.16  
Thus, expectations are found to be just as important if not more important than 
the inflation itself.  The Southern Cone has seen periods of hyperinflation during 
the last thirty years and each state has chosen its own methods for dealing with 
inflation, thus inflation and inflation expectations could play a significant role in 
any variation in growth strategies. 
Labor and capital productivity are also found to positively affect growth 
and real output.  Mankiw finds the importance of capital productivity using a 
                                            
13 Stephen Kosack and Jennifer Tobin, “Funding Self-Sustaining Development: The Role of 
Aid, FDI and Government in Economic Success,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (Winter 
2006): 205–243. 
14 Stanley Fischer, “The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth,” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 32, no. 3 (Dec. 1993): 485–512; Robert E. Lucas Jr., “Inflation and Welfare,” 
Econometrica 68, no. 2 (Mar. 2000): 247–274. 
15 Sami Alpanda and Adam Honig, “The Impact of Central Bank Independence on Political 
Monetary Cycles in Advanced and Developing Nations,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
41, no. 7 (Oct. 2009): 1365–1389; William Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz and William Roberts 
Clark, “The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions,” International Organization 56, no. 4, The 
Political Economy of Monetary Institutions (Autumn 2002): 693–723; Andreas Freytag, “The 
Credibility of Monetary Reform: New Evidence,” Public Choice 124, no. 3/4 (Sep. 2005): 391–
409; Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel et al., “Inflation Targeting in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico: Performance, 
Credibility, and the Exchange Rate [with Comments],” Economía 2, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 31–89; 
Leo Svensson, “Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule,” Journal of Monetary Economics 
43, no. 3 (Jun. 1999): 607–654. 
16 Antonio Fatás, Ilian Mihov and Andrew K. Rose, “Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy,” 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39, no. 5 (Aug. 2007): 1163–1176. 
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Solow growth model17 and Gregorio confirms the influence on labor productivity 
on real growth and output.18  Unemployment is a measure of a labor pool that is 
underutilized, and Milton Friedman finds that tightening measures aimed at 
controlling inflation can lead to higher unemployment,19 thus there should be 
some overlap between low inflation and lower labor productivity on a per capita 
basis.  There is little question that productivity influences growth, but how much 
output during a given year is due to that change in productivity is still a matter of 
some question. 
Outside of the purely economic realm, Hojman and Weyland find a 
positive correlation between the level of democracy in a country and its level of 
output and rate of growth.20  Kurtz agrees with this assessment, but finds that as 
level of democracy goes up GDP per capita may go down and income inequality 
certainly rises.21 Liberal democracies are often associated with open market 
financial systems and liberal trade policies; these are thought to be the 
intervening factors leading to output growth, and thus there may be co-variation 
with some of the components of the Washington Consensus. 
Just as important as the policies themselves, is why states choose to 
implement these policies in the first place.  The political economy literature offers 
several insights into the policy making process, but there is certainly a consensus 
that governments of all forms, but especially representative democracies, must 
                                            
17 N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and David N. Weil, “A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economic Growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, no. 2 (May 1992): 407–437. 
18 José De Gregorio, Productivity Growth and Disinflation in ChileNational Bureau of 
Economic Research, [2004]). 
19 Milton Friedman, “Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice,” Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 14, no. 1 (Feb. 1982): 98–118. 
20 David E. Hojman, “Poverty and Inequality in Chile: Are Democratic Politics and Neoliberal 
Economics Good for You?” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 38, no. 2/3, 
Special Double Issue: Poverty and Inequality in Latin America (Summer - Autumn 1996): 73–96; 
Kurt Weyland, “Economic Policy in Chile’s New Democracy,” Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs 41, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 67–96. 
21 Marcus J. Kurtz, “Understanding the Third World Welfare State after Neoliberalism: The 
Politics of Social Provision in Chile and Mexico,” Comparative Politics 34, no. 3 (Apr. 2002): 293–
313. 
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pay social and political costs in order to implement reform plans.22  Additionally, 
even if the new plan would be pareto superior to the current circumstances, there 
are transition costs and distributional effects that may lead those with vested 
interests to resist the changes.23  Przworski finds that the best strategy for 
democratic governments is to immediately implement a radical program instead 
of a gradual one, regardless of popular preferences in the first place.  Even if the 
programs must be moderated later, the political costs for the politicians are 
smaller, and more reforms are implemented under this strategy.24  Further, 
despite traditional neoliberal thinking, Tendler finds that the state must play a 
central role in reform adoption for the strategies to be successful.  By conducting 
public information campaigns, taking over some bureaucratic tasks previously 
assigned to municipal governments, and encouraging and assisting in the 
formation of civic associations, the central government influences good civil 
society.  Good civil society then leads to good government and the cycle 
perpetuates itself.25  This means that identical states could implement the same 
strategy, but because of the form or quality of the government, the reforms may 
be less effective or even end up reversed under pressure. 
This difference in results based on the form of government in place could 
potentially be helpful in explaining some of the variation in program success 
across Latin America and the Caribbean.  Fortunately, Haggard and Kaufman 
find that there are strategies that can be implemented to offset some of the 
difficulties democratic governments (especially unconsolidated democratic 
governments) face when installing a reform plan.26  Nevertheless, the transition 
                                            
22 Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic 
Transitions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 9; Adam Przeworski and Group 
on East-South Systems Transformations, Sustainable Democracy (Cambridge [England]; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 70. 
23 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 160. 
24 Ibid., 174. 
25 Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997), 16. 
26 Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, 376–377. 
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to democracy occurred throughout the region during the period of study, and this 
may help explain why the reform plans implemented took different forms 
throughout the region. 
Another potential explanation comes from the literature on policy diffusion.  
Weyland finds that policy diffusion occurs in a specific geographic proximity, 
proceeds in waves in an S-shaped pattern, and entails the adoption of the same 
policy framework in each of the states.27  Under policy diffusion, the development 
program would have started in one state, and through the heuristics of 
availability, representativeness, and anchoring, spread throughout the region.  
The availability heuristic would imply that the rampant successes of the economic 
development strategies in the initial state (in this case Chile) would cause the 
neighboring states to overrate this strategy because its effects are seen as 
immediate and relevant.  The representative heuristic then would cause the next 
state to overvalue the sample size as relevant for the entire region—ignoring 
specific characteristics of the initial case not present in the subsequent cases.  
Finally, the anchoring heuristic sets the initial value from which to deviate at the 
level of the first state.28  This means that the original development strategy 
implemented by the first state is used as the basis for all other strategies nearby.  
Because of these heuristics, the reforms implemented by the follow-on states 
may not have been the ideal development strategies, and they would have 
eventually been changed when the political cost became too high or the 
strategies were seen as failing. 
The final, and perhaps most contentious, potential determinate of GDP 
growth is social development.  Segura-Ubiergo expands on earlier work by 
Haggard and Kauffman and details the paths taken by welfare states in Latin 
                                            
27 Kurt Weyland, “Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension 
Reform,” World Politics 57, no. 2 (Jan. 2005): 265. 
28 Ibid., 284–285. 
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America.29  Segura-Ubiergo uses social spending as the dependent variable 
however, and as such does not examine the impact of social spending on 
economic growth.30  For preliminary analyses of social development as a 
dependent variable, we must return to the economic literature. 
During the neoliberal zenith, it was argued by Martin Feldstein (and 
others) that high levels of social spending were fueling overconsumption, 
preventing societal saving, and thus lowering levels of investment to promote 
growth.31  Further arguments promoted the idea that social spending provided a 
disincentive to work by providing too high of an income for the unemployed.32  
On the other side of the spectrum, Midgely and others have argued that social 
spending on “productivist” social programs can promote economic growth.33  
These programs generally focus on education and health as a means of 
improving worker productivity while simultaneously improving quality of life.34  
Despite the theoretical underpinnings on both sides of the argument, little 
quantitative research has resolved the debate—and even less research has been 
done concerning social spending and growth in Latin America.  Although the 
                                            
29 For Haggard and Kauffman’s original argument see:  Robert R. Kaufman and Alex 
Segura-Ubiergo, “Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America A Time-
Series Cross-Section Analysis, 1973–97,” World Politics 53, no. 4 (Jul. 2001): 553–587; and 
Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, Development, Democracy, and Welfare States: Latin 
America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
30 Segura-Ubiergo does take a preliminary look at the effectiveness of social spending on 
lowering inequality, but does not address pro-growth components of social development.  See:  
Alex Segura-Ubiergo, The Political Economy of the Welfare State in Latin America : Globalization, 
Democracy, and Development (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 276–
280. 
31 Martin Feldstein, “Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital 
Accumulation,” Journal of Political Economy 82, no. 5 (Sep. - Oct. 1974): 905–926; Robert 
William Bacon and Walter Eltis, Britain’s Economic Problem: Too Few Producers, 2d ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1978). 
32 Charles A. Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980 (New York: Basic 
Books, 1984). 
33 For a succinct overview of Midgley’s work on this topic see:  James Midgley and Kwong-
leung Tang, “Introduction: Social Policy, Economic Growth and Developmental Welfare,” 
International Journal of Social Welfare 10, no. 4 (2001): 244–252. 
34 See also:  George Psacharopoulos, “Education and Development: A Review,” The World 
Bank Research Observer 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1988): pp. 99–116; Gary S. Becker, “Investment in 
Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Political Economy 70, no. 5, Part 2: 
Investment in Human Beings (Oct. 1962): 9–49. 
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results of this thesis are far from definitive, the findings should at least facilitate 
much discussion and encourage future studies. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This study begins with a factor analysis on key growth constraints across 
the universe of cases.  Indices reflecting the ten components of the original 
Washington Consensus and the ten components of the “Augmented” Washington 
Consensus as described by Rodrik are included as well as measures meant to 
reflect the other growth constraints discussed in the literature review.  This 
approach allows preexisting, fully developed, academically scrutinized, and 
reliable indices to be used and provides a consistent approach for country 
scoring across the cases.  The factor analysis shows which components of the 
following indices are most closely aligned with growth potential across the 
universe of cases. 
Thus: 
 ( )GCI IEF WGI HDIGrowthPotential f WEF HF WB LPI UN      (Eqn. 1.1)  
  
where:  WEFGCI =  World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness  
  Index 
 HFIEF =  Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom 
 WBWGI =  World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 LPI =  Legatum Prosperity Index 
 UNHDI =  United Nations Human Development Index 
 
The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) data come from the World 
Economic Forum (WEF), The Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) data come from 
a joint project of the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) come from the World Bank, the Legatum 
Prosperity Index (LPI) is an annual product of the Legatum Institute in London, 
and the Human Development Index (HDI) is a product of the United Nations 
(UN).  I provide a full explanation of the development of the combined datasets in 
Chapter II as well as an explanation as to their coverage of all potential 
explanatory variables discussed so far. 
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Once factor analysis is complete using Eqn. 1 on the universe of cases, I 
divide the cases into two subgroupings based on the WEF Stage of 
Development.35  A factor analysis is performed on each of these subgroupings to 
determine what potential growth constraints are most closely aligned with growth 
potential in each of them.  The results of this factor analysis provide insight into 
potential differences in growth strategies that would be most effective in each 
subgrouping.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Six chapters comprise this thesis.  This chapter provided an overview of 
the major research question posed by this thesis as well as a discussion of my 
general approach.  Chapter II includes the results of the factor analyses on both 
the universe of data as well as the two country subgroupings.  Chapter III 
provides a quantitative analysis of the role democratic negotiation and targeted 
social spending played in the implementation of neoliberal structural adjustment 
strategies across Latin America and the Caribbean from 1970 to 2000.  Chapter 
IV provides a quantitative analysis of the affects growth and associated inequality 
had on levels of violence.  Chapter V reexamines the assumptions of Chapter II 
and performs a discriminate analysis on the countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean to determine the proper subgrouping of each.  This ensures the policy 
recommendations for each country is appropriate according to where they are 
currently located along the growth spectrum.  Chapter VI provides a conclusion 
as well as recommendations for future research and some policy prescriptions 
grounded in my findings. 
  
                                            
35 A full explanation of the division point chosen is provided in Chapter II. 
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II. FACTOR ANALYSIS ON KEY CONSTRAINTS ON GROWTH 
IN LATIN AMERICA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses my first puzzle identified in the introduction; 
namely, why has the orthodox neoliberal model had success in some parts in 
Latin America, and why has it been a dismal failure in others.  The answer to this 
question is somewhat surprising and has a profound impact on potential growth 
strategies for the region. I begin with an overview of the potential growth 
constraints in Latin America and a framework with which to divide the region into 
two subregions of growth potential.  Next, I use a factor analysis on the universe 
of cases to show which growth constraints are more closely aligned with growth 
potential in each subregion.  Finally, I discuss the implications of these findings 
for generating targeted growth strategies that look very different in each 
subregion. 
For the purposes of this chapter, I assume that the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) has correctly identified the stage of growth for each of the 
countries of the world and specifically for each country in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  This assumption is necessary for the performance of the factor 
analysis, and is justified considering large number of cases under study.  It is 
important to note here that I do not make the same assumption in Chapter V, and 
there I perform a discriminate analysis to determine the classification of each 
country in Latin America and the Caribbean properly.  Thus, I report the Latin 
American subregions here as the WEF Stages of Development would divide 
them, but I adjust the subregions in Chapter V to better reflect the actual status of 
the Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
B. POTENTIAL GROWTH CONSTRAINTS 
For more than three decades, the WEF has published their annual Global 
Competitive Index (GCI), ranking the countries of the world along twelve pillars of 
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competitiveness.  The WEF’s GCI has become the international standard for 
determining a country’s growth potential within the world economy and is thus a 
good place to start for examining potential constraints on growth.  The WEF 
defines competitiveness as, “the set of institutions, policies, and factors that 
determine the level of productivity of a country.”36  By extension, the level of 
productivity also determines growth potential in the medium to long run as well as 
a country’s ability to obtain and sustain a high level of income. 
The WEF breaks down the factors that influence competitiveness and 
productivity into twelve pillars that are then combined into a weighted factor 
average to come up with a final GCI score for each country.  For the purposes of 
this chapter, the final GCI score is called the “growth potential.”  The twelve 
pillars that make up the growth potential are:  Institutions, Infrastructure, 
Macroeconomic Environment, Health and Primary Education, Higher Education 
and Training, Goods Market Efficiency, Labor Market Efficiency, Financial Market 
Development, Technological Readiness, Market Size, Business Sophistication, 
and Innovation.37  The Market Size pillar has been removed from the models 
used in this chapter due to statistical insignificance and complete independence 
from the other factors.  In other words, Market Size fell out of all models as an 
independent and statistically insignificant variable. 
The WEF uses the weighted index to sort the countries of the world into 3 
distinct stages of development.  These are:  Stage 1 (factor driven economies), 
Stage 2 (efficiency driven economies), and Stage 3 (innovation driven 
economies).38  In between each of these stages are countries in transition from 
one stage to the next.  For simplicity, I place the transition countries into their 
own stages that I call Stage 1.5 (for countries transitioning between Stage 1 and 
Stage 2) and Stage 2.5 (for countries transitioning between Stage 2 and 3).  In 
                                            
36 Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011 (Geneva, Switzerland: 




Latin America, no country has yet reached Stage 3 although several are very 
close.  In fact, an examination of the groupings of Latin American countries yields 
two independent subregions that are incredibly different from one another.  I call 
these Subregions I and II.  Table 3 lists each country by subregion, and Figure 1 
and Figure 2 show geographically and quantitatively (according to WEF pillar 
scores) just how different these two subregions are.39 
 
Subregion I (Stages 1–2) Subregion II (Stages 2.5–3) 
The Andes and Central America The Southern Cone 
Bolivia (1.0) Argentina (2.5) 
Nicaragua (1.0) Brazil (2.5) 
Guatemala (1.5) Chile (2.5) 
Honduras (1.5) Mexico (2.5) 
Jamaica (1.5) Uruguay (2.5) 
Paraguay (1.5)  
Venezuela (1.5)  
Belize (2.0)  
Colombia (2.0)  
Costa Rica (2.0)  
Dominican Republic (2.0)  
Ecuador (2.0)  
El Salvador (2.0)  
Panama (2.0)  
Peru (2.0)  
Source:  World Economic Forum  
Table 3.   Latin American Countries at Various Stages of Development 






                                            
39 Figures 2 to 5 are radar plots of the various indices intended to show the variation across 
the two Latin American subregions.  Each axis represents one component of the respective index 
and the two star plots represent the scores on each component by each subregion.  Displaying 
the data on a radar plot allows for a rapid comparison across multiple dimensions of each 
subregion, and I attempt to use them to show major disparities between the two subregions 










Figure 2.   World Economic Forum Twelve Pillars of Competitiveness in Latin 
America Subregion I and Subregion II 
Additional constraints on growth may come from areas not well captured 
by the World Economic Forum’s Twelve Pillars of Competitiveness.  The 
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal publish an annual Index of 
Economic Freedom (IEF) that may capture additional growth constraints.  The 
ten factors measured by the IEF parallel the core principles of the original 
Washington Consensus and include:  Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal 
Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, 
Financial Freedom, Property Rights, Freedom from Corruption, and Labor 
Freedom.40  Although the IEF is operating on the principle that more government 
                                            
40 Terry Miller and Kim R. Holmes, 2011 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, DC: The 
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spending is a normative bad41, the data and index are useful nonetheless, and 
when combined together with the other indexes can help to illustrate how 
appropriate levels of government spending can be used most effectively to 
promote growth.  Latin American Subregions I and II also rank out quite 
differently in the IEF scores.  Figure 3 shows a comparison. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom in Latin American 
Subregion I and Subregion II 
 
Although the GCI and IEF are each intended to capture some measures of 
good government they are not complete and there is a better index available 
from the World Bank to measure governance and anti-corruption in a more 
                                            
41 For IEF scoring purposes, higher levels of government per capita spending results in lower 
scores in both the Government Spending and Fiscal Freedom categories.  This explains why the 
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accurate and comprehensive manner.  The World Bank has been publishing their 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) since 1996, and they are recognized as 
the most thorough and accurate reflection of general governance within a 
country.  The World Bank has divided the overall governance scores into six 
independent categories for scoring governance and anti-corruption.  They are:  
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.42  The 
variation between Latin American Subregion I and Subregion II is striking in 
these categories.  Subregion II scores significantly higher than Subregion I in 
every governance category.  Figure 4 shows these differences. 
 
Figure 4.   World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators in Latin American 
Subregion I and Subregion II 
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Although the GCI captures some forms of social spending with the Health 
and Primary Education and Higher Education and Training pillars, there are 
significant categories of social spending that this index does not capture.  
Further, no index introduced thus far fully captures the potential constraints 
placed on country growth due to entrepreneurship.  The GCI Innovation pillar 
may capture the “spirit” of entrepreneurship well, but there are several functions 
of entrepreneurs (e.g., small-business owners, job creators, and improving on 
efficiency to maximize profits) within an economy other than innovation.  The 
Legatum Institute’s Legatum Prosperity Index (LPI) is comprised of six key 
determinates of a country’s overall prosperity.  These include:  Economy, 
Entrepreneurship and Opportunity, Governance, Education, Health, Safety and 
Security, Personal Freedom, and Social Capital.  The Safety and Security index 
includes both physical security and measures of social protection such as social 
security and basic welfare.  The Social Capital index also adds a measure of a 
country’s interpersonal networks and overall level of trust.43  Thus, the inclusion 
of the LPI adds additional measures of social development, entrepreneurship, 
and social capital, to those measures already introduced as potential growth 
constraints.  As was the case for the three indices already introduced, the LPI 
average scores for Latin American countries in Subregion I were significantly 
lower than the average scores for the countries in Subregion II. The radar plot in 







                                            
43 Legatum Institute, The 2011 Legatum Prosperity Index (London, United Kingdom: 
Legatum Institute, 2011). 
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Figure 5.   Legatum Prosperity Index in Latin American Subregion I  
and Subregion II 
The United Nations (UN) also generates a yearly index that is designed to 
capture potential growth limitations in the form of health, education, and living 
standards.  Combined together, the UN Human Development Index (HDI) is 
meant to capture the quality of an individual’s life rather than just their income or 
social wellbeing individually.44  The HDI has become the standard in international 
growth measurements and its inclusion in the combined dataset is intended to 
ensure all potential measures of constraints on development are captured.  The 
HDI is a score between zero and one with one being the highest level of human 
development that can be achieved and zero being the lowest.  The HDI average 
                                            
44 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2011 (New York, 
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of Latin American Subregion I is 0.687 and the average of Subregion II is 0.775.  
Thus, the minimal variation within each subregion is paltry compared to the scale 
of the differences between Subregion I and Subregion II.  
C. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Data 
The CGI, IEF, WGI, LPI, and HDI indices were first pooled together into a 
combined dataset on potential growth constraints for the universe of cases.  The 
most limiting index case wise is the LPI, which contains 110 countries, however 
the other five indices are similar in scope and magnitude.  All data come from 
2011 and are the most current available for each country.45  The worldwide 
excluded countries include troubled hot spots such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as 
well as failed states such as Somalia.  In Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
excluded countries include Cuba, which is notoriously elusive when it comes to 
providing economic data for international consumption, and Haiti, which has been 
in a near failed state status since the catastrophic earthquake there in 2010.  
Also excluded from the combined dataset are Suriname, Guyana, and French 
Guiana.  These countries are often not included as part of the Latin American 
region, they are small, and economic data is particularly sparse and difficult to 
obtain.  With the exclusion of these five countries from Latin America, the overall 
dataset still includes 20 countries as shown in Table 3 and Figure 1.  Additionally, 
despite the lack of data available, it is clear that all five excluded countries fall 




                                            
45 The World Economic Forum has since released the 2012 Global Competitive Index, but it 
was unavailable during the conduct of this research. 
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2.  Hypothesis1 
Targeted social spending and social development has played a central 
role in both the implementation and success of orthodox neoliberal reforms 
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.  Social spending eased the political 
costs of structural adjustment and separately played a central role in actually 
achieving growth. 
3. Methodology 
The methodology follows a similar path as was undertaken by Robert 
Looney in his paper on entrepreneurship in Pakistan,46 but the focus here has 
been broadened from a single country to Latin America as a region within the 
context of a world economy.  In addition, the importance of social development 
as constraining or aiding economic development is understudied.  Thus, the 
inclusion of the entire LPI and the UN HDI47 in my combined dataset will help to 
illuminate just where social development indicators fall within the key dimensions 
of growth potential.  I perform a factor analysis on this combined data set to 
determine how many distinct phenomena exist within the 39 potential growth 
constraints outlined above.  I also examine where Growth Potential fits in relation 
to these distinct phenomena to elucidate those phenomenon most associated 
with Growth Potential.  Finally, I re-perform the factor analysis on the two subsets 
of the data divided along the stages of growth.  The first subset is for countries 
within Stages 1 through 2, and the second subset includes countries in Stages 
2.5 and 3 (These parallel Latin American Subregion I and Subregion II as shown 
in Table 3 and Figure 1).  A comparison between the results of these two factor 
analyses can then shed some light on why growth strategies within one 
 
 
                                            
46 Robert E. Looney, Entrepreneurship and the Process of Development: A Framework for 
Applied Expeditionary Economics in Pakistan (Kansas City, Kansas: Kauffman Foundation, 
2011). 
47 These indices were not included in Looney’s work. 
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subregion of Latin America are not necessarily well suited for countries that are 
not in the same subregion.  Table 3 reports the results of the initial factor analysis 
on the universe of cases. 
D. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
For the total sample of countries, growth potential is most closely aligned 
with Factor 1, the Competitiveness and Governance dimension, specifically 
WEF’s innovation, institutions, business sophistication, market efficiencies and 
technological readiness along the competitiveness dimension and measures of 
governance from every available index.  However, growth potential is also closely 
aligned with Factor 2, the Social Development and Entrepreneurship dimension, 
which includes measures of health, education, human development, and 
entrepreneurship.  Thus, an analysis of the results of the factor analysis on the 
total sample of countries provides us with little helpful information, except to say 
that growth potential is not as closely aligned with the Economic Freedom, Fiscal 
Policy, and Labor Market dimensions as is frequently reported in the literature. 
Looking a little more closely at the results in Table 4, it becomes clear that 
the linkages between growth potential and entrepreneurship and social 
development when examined as the universe of cases are likely blurred by the 
wide variation in the intra-country environments.  In other words, as outlined in 
the discussion of the variation between Subregions I and II across the various 
indices used in this chapter, the division of the countries into two subgroups is 
both useful and necessary in order to glean any specific implications for 
Subregions I and II.  Thus, by re-preforming the factor analyses on the two 
subgroupings, the variations within the subgroupings are reduced and more 
useful results can be obtained.  Table 5 presents the results for the factor 
analysis on countries in Stages 1 through 2, and Table 6 presents the results for 

































      
WEF Innovation 0.786 0.351 0.156 0.308 0.064 
WEF Institutions 0.781 0.269 0.188 0.226 0.364 
WEF Business Sophistication 0.775 0.393 0.223 0.200 -0.021 
WEF Goods Market Efficiency 0.772 0.255 0.334 0.020 0.326 
WEF Financial Market Development 0.770 0.116 0.285 -0.002 0.208 
WEF Growth Potential 0.732 0.579 0.218 0.137 0.178 
IEF Freedom from Corruption 0.627 0.399 0.395 0.389 0.285 
LPI Governance 0.624 0.397 0.463 0.346 0.256 
WB Government Effectiveness 0.606 0.498 0.430 0.333 0.193 
WB Control of Corruption 0.603 0.382 0.430 0.377 0.288 
IEF Property Rights 0.602 0.338 0.488 0.368 0.241 
WEF Technological Readiness 0.572 0.554 0.381 0.375 0.127 
WB Rule of Law 0.569 0.440 0.458 0.394 0.234 
LPI Social Capital 0.520 0.390 0.210 0.359 0.185 
IEF Business Freedom 0.441 0.396 0.406 0.227 0.213 
WEF Health and Primary Education 0.280 0.862 0.210 0.164 0.055 
LPI Education 0.198 0.849 0.271 0.304 0.096 
Human Development Index 0.262 0.835 0.321 0.239 0.081 
LPI Health 0.269 0.828 0.314 0.265 0.038 
WEF Higher Education and Training 0.467 0.706 0.274 0.347 0.139 
LPI Entrepreneurship & Opportunity 0.484 0.640 0.399 0.340 0.176 
WEF Infrastructure 0.577 0.640 0.291 0.213 0.129 
LPI Economy 0.571 0.607 0.387 -0.114 -0.045 
LPI Safety and Security 0.288 0.534 0.480 0.401 0.272 
WEF Macroeconomic Environment 0.448 0.487 0.017 -0.357 0.082 
IEF Trade Freedom 0.107 0.312 0.822 0.137 0.184 
IEF Investment Freedom 0.300 0.111 0.791 0.262 0.129 
IEF Monetary Freedom 0.266 0.178 0.771 -0.192 -0.066 
IEF Tariff Rate -0.112 -0.366 -0.765 -0.120 -0.117 
IEF Financial Freedom 0.362 0.193 0.716 0.215 0.165 
WB Regulatory Quality 0.505 0.395 0.636 0.294 0.187 
WB Voice and Accountability 0.260 0.264 0.628 0.568 0.032 
WB Political Stability / No Violence 0.227 0.349 0.465 0.382 0.427 
IEF Government Spending -0.025 -0.294 -0.035 -0.851 -0.052 
IEF Tax Burden % of GDP 0.153 0.321 0.253 0.798 -0.005 
IEF Fiscal Freedom -0.466 -0.018 -0.080 -0.693 0.291 
LPI Personal Freedom 0.343 0.193 0.454 0.485 0.182 
IEF Labor Freedom 0.278 0.041 0.132 -0.122 0.794 
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.552 0.151 0.272 0.076 0.649 
      Notes:  Extraction Method:  IBM SPSS 20.0 Principle Component Analysis.  Rotation Method Variamax with Kaiser 
Normalization.  Rotation converged in 7 iterations.  WEF = World Economic Forum Dataset, IEF = Heritage Foundation 
Index of Economic Freedom Dataset, WB = World Bank Governance Dataset, LPI = Legatum Prosperity Index 
Dataset, Human Development Index:  United Nations Human Development Index 2011 






































         
LPI Education 0.942 0.088 0.052 0.065 -0.072 0.071 0.100 -0.019 
Human Development Index 0.921 0.150 0.057 0.091 -0.015 0.041 -0.042 -0.125 
LPI Health 0.914 0.161 -0.012 0.126 0.053 -0.028 -0.098 -0.077 
WEF Health and Primary Education 0.900 0.053 0.081 -0.067 0.106 -0.039 0.030 -0.041 
WEF Higher Education and Training 0.805 0.153 0.423 0.074 -0.160 0.037 0.049 0.134 
LPI Entrepreneurship & Opportunity 0.754 0.371 0.241 0.311 -0.048 0.117 0.021 0.035 
WEF Infrastructure 0.659 0.373 0.476 0.081 0.055 -0.167 0.115 0.134 
WEF Technological Readiness 0.648 0.266 0.518 0.264 -0.022 0.070 0.029 0.025 
WEF Growth Potential 0.625 0.313 0.578 -0.036 0.187 -0.144 0.262 0.125 
WEF Macroeconomic Environment 0.485 0.129 0.027 -0.105 0.435 -0.246 0.343 0.318 
LPI Safety and Security 0.447 0.372 -0.222 0.261 0.010 0.346 0.358 0.084 
WB Control of Corruption 0.174 0.842 0.172 0.101 0.010 0.209 0.232 -0.010 
WB Rule of Law 0.272 0.821 0.260 0.110 0.060 0.129 0.217 0.067 
IEF Freedom from Corruption 0.217 0.753 0.350 0.147 -0.084 0.169 0.221 0.035 
IEF Property Rights 0.050 0.746 0.316 0.318 0.011 0.071 0.036 -0.107 
WB Government Effectiveness 0.405 0.724 0.360 0.072 0.114 0.127 0.104 0.110 
LPI Governance 0.267 0.684 0.377 0.165 0.188 0.294 0.238 -0.003 
IEF Business Freedom 0.218 0.670 -0.053 0.254 0.017 -0.332 -0.038 -0.009 
WB Regulatory Quality 0.240 0.650 0.274 0.528 0.059 0.202 0.037 0.002 
WEF Institutions 0.050 0.610 0.557 -0.210 0.034 -0.144 0.392 0.026 
WEF Business Sophistication 0.350 0.202 0.861 0.069 0.185 -0.039 -0.024 -0.007 
WEF Financial Market Development 0.070 0.278 0.846 0.151 0.032 0.143 0.054 -0.051 
WEF Innovation 0.176 0.211 0.807 -0.138 0.082 0.018 0.211 0.238 
WEF Goods Market Efficiency 0.093 0.403 0.749 0.150 0.190 -0.095 0.263 -0.041 
IEF Trade Freedom 0.169 0.155 -0.060 0.839 0.063 0.109 0.252 -0.001 
IEF Tariff Rate -0.217 -0.044 -0.038 -0.784 -0.090 -0.131 -0.223 -0.058 
IEF Financial Freedom 0.033 0.319 0.185 0.746 0.021 0.226 0.026 -0.074 
IEF Investment Freedom -0.112 0.459 0.112 0.638 0.034 0.290 -0.055 -0.284 
IEF Government Spending -0.093 -0.030 0.249 0.125 0.867 0.086 -0.047 -0.006 
IEF Tax Burden % of GDP 0.153 0.092 -0.102 0.182 -0.696 0.245 0.161 0.414 
LPI Economy 0.585 0.176 0.152 0.172 0.680 -0.012 0.052 0.118 
IEF Monetary Freedom 0.058 0.273 -0.108 0.543 0.610 0.082 0.085 0.035 
LPI Personal Freedom -0.035 0.078 0.034 0.203 0.039 0.839 0.081 0.028 
WB Voice and Accountability 0.033 0.310 -0.039 0.393 -0.106 0.727 -0.173 0.036 
WEF Labor Market Efficiency -0.065 0.148 0.385 0.268 -0.002 0.026 0.749 0.009 
IEF Labor Freedom -0.005 0.284 0.206 0.140 -0.013 -0.098 0.637 -0.146 
WB Political Stability / No Violence 0.188 0.347 -0.029 0.228 -0.160 0.430 0.586 0.112 
IEF Fiscal Freedom 0.397 -0.003 -0.082 0.263 0.073 -0.195 0.131 -0.715 
         Notes:  Extraction Method:  IBM SPSS 20.0 Principle Component Analysis.  Rotation Method Variamax with Kaiser Normalization.  Rotation converged in 12 iterations.  WEF = World Economic Forum 
Dataset, IEF = Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom Dataset, WB = World Bank Governance Dataset, LPI = Legatum Prosperity Index Dataset, Human Development Index:  United Nations 
Human Development Index 2011 
Table 5.   Factor Analysis – Stage 1 - 2 Countries (loadings on principal dimension) 
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WEF Innovation 0.868 0.146 0.113 0.270 0.107 0.024 
WEF Business Sophistication 0.851 0.048 0.143 0.259 0.033 0.069 
WEF Growth Potential 0.837 0.288 0.211 0.109 0.296 0.181 
LPI Economy 0.758 0.300 0.109 0.027 0.161 0.330 
WEF Infrastructure 0.757 0.384 0.223 0.063 0.057 -0.022 
WEF Technological Readiness 0.686 0.454 0.334 0.268 0.147 0.058 
LPI Entrepreneurship & Opportunity 0.655 0.539 0.208 0.268 0.304 0.049 
WEF Goods Market Efficiency 0.650 0.265 0.472 -0.129 0.379 0.092 
WEF Higher Education and Training 0.643 0.493 0.195 0.310 0.296 0.001 
WEF Institutions 0.617 0.490 0.340 0.059 0.301 0.254 
WB Government Effectiveness 0.614 0.499 0.461 0.194 0.258 0.149 
WEF Financial Market Development 0.600 0.097 0.371 -0.076 0.361 0.400 
LPI Health 0.590 0.524 0.130 0.426 0.086 -0.198 
Human Development Index 0.574 0.525 0.253 0.307 0.215 -0.134 
WEF Health and Primary Education 0.558 0.494 0.273 0.209 0.194 -0.244 
IEF Property Rights 0.520 0.484 0.466 0.222 0.308 0.206 
IEF Business Freedom 0.475 0.444 0.389 0.182 0.255 -0.042 
LPI Safety and Security 0.283 0.866 0.296 0.130 0.049 -0.063 
WB Political Stability / No Violence 0.179 0.818 0.322 0.051 -0.020 0.090 
LPI Personal Freedom 0.239 0.725 0.030 0.335 0.219 0.312 
WB Control of Corruption 0.532 0.614 0.373 0.146 0.262 0.240 
IEF Freedom from Corruption 0.576 0.592 0.360 0.144 0.292 0.181 
WB Rule of Law 0.501 0.555 0.481 0.301 0.251 0.111 
LPI Social Capital 0.443 0.549 0.034 0.370 0.442 0.201 
LPI Governance 0.534 0.541 0.408 0.270 0.322 0.193 
IEF Trade Freedom 0.119 0.260 0.895 0.042 0.036 -0.047 
IEF Tariff Rate -0.158 -0.262 -0.837 -0.059 0.029 0.147 
IEF Investment Freedom 0.128 0.121 0.771 0.263 0.212 0.239 
WB Regulatory Quality 0.472 0.331 0.660 0.221 0.341 0.168 
IEF Monetary Freedom 0.489 0.092 0.600 0.013 0.034 -0.016 
IEF Financial Freedom 0.284 0.039 0.574 0.285 0.480 0.146 
IEF Tax Burden % of GDP 0.101 0.159 0.106 0.903 -0.087 -0.021 
IEF Fiscal Freedom -0.338 -0.110 -0.055 -0.852 0.124 -0.156 
IEF Government Spending -0.075 -0.163 -0.160 -0.832 0.081 0.275 
WB Voice and Accountability 0.098 0.474 0.431 0.655 0.115 0.158 
LPI Education 0.241 0.555 0.035 0.559 0.248 -0.175 
IEF Labor Freedom 0.210 0.175 0.117 -0.282 0.788 -0.022 
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.540 0.321 0.248 -0.118 0.636 0.023 
WEF Macroeconomic Environment 0.470 0.212 0.054 -0.335 -0.004 0.595 
       Notes:  Extraction Method:  IBM SPSS 20.0 Principle Component Analysis.  Rotation Method Variamax with Kaiser Normalization.  Rotation converged in 9 iterations.  WEF = World Economic Forum 
Dataset, IEF = Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom Dataset, WB = World Bank Governance Dataset, LPI = Legatum Prosperity Index Dataset, Human Development Index:  United Nations 
Human Development Index 2011 
 
Table 6.   Factor Analysis – Stage 2.5 - 3 Countries (loadings on principal dimensions)
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For countries in Latin American Subregion I, the results of the factor 
analysis in Table 5 show growth potential is most closely aligned with the Social 
Development and Entrepreneurship dimension followed by the Competitiveness 
dimension.  For countries in Subregion I, the implications of these results is that 
growth potential can be increased by focusing energy and resources in the 
direction of Social Development and Entrepreneurship first.  This runs counter to 
the general Washington Consensus ideas that less government spending is 
better and that decreasing a country’s fiscal obligations is the only way to get 
growth started.  In the case of the countries in Subregion I, this appears not to be 
the case.  In fact, by properly targeting government resources (even increasing 
spending) in the direction of social development and entrepreneurship, the 
countries in Subregion I can increase their growth potential, holding all else 
equal.  In other words, even without implementing other market reforms. 
For the more developed countries in Latin American Subregion II, the 
results of the factor analysis in Table 6 show that growth potential is most closely 
aligned with the Innovation, Competitiveness, and Social Development 
dimension.  Although Social development indicators are still aligned with growth 
potential in Subregion II, they are less closely aligned then they were in the 
Subregion I results.  Entrepreneurship, and the related Innovation and 
Technological readiness, plays a much larger role in supporting growth potential 
in Subregion II countries.  Although Social Development is still important for the 
Subregion II countries, targeted spending to improve entrepreneurship and 
innovation will make a greater impact in the Subregion II countries.  Further, 
training programs that both increase the level of entrepreneurship and improve 
levels of higher education would provide stimulus along several dimensions that 
are closely related with growth potential and may provide the most influence for 
the money spent. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Latin America and the Caribbean is not a uniform region full of countries 
that are in need of the same growth strategies as dictated by the International 
Monetary Fund or the World Bank.  By looking at each individual country and 
placing them within the proper subregion, targeted pro-growth programs can be 
generated that focus on the areas that are most closely aligned with growth 
potential given the country’s current stage of development.  For countries that are 
located within geographic and developmental Subregion I, strategies most 
closely aligned with increasing a country’s growth potential focus on improving 
measures of social development first and basic entrepreneurship second.  For 
countries in Subregion II, strategies that focus on improving measures of 
entrepreneurship, competitiveness, and innovation first have the greatest impact 
on increasing growth potential.  Programs aimed at increasing levels of social 
development also greatly benefit countries in Subregion II, and may lower the 
overall political cost of reform implementation as will be shown in the next 
chapter.  Programs that include targeted entrepreneurship education to both 
improve social development scores in the education factors and improve scores 
along the entrepreneurship and innovation dimensions, may provide the greatest 
influence on growth potential in Subregion II countries for the least amount of 
money spent. 
Many of the potential constraints on growth that are frequently touted as 
the only way to achieve lasting development have been shown here to have little 
correlation to growth potential across the universe of cases and specifically in 
Latin American Subregions I and II.  For example, Market openness, economic 
freedoms, labor markets, and fiscal policy were shown to be less closely aligned 
with growth potential than all other possible factors.  Although other research has 
shown close linkages between these factors and economic growth, this chapter 
demonstrates that targeting less politically unpopular constraints on growth can 
have a greater impact than previously thought.  In both Subregions I and II, the 
findings of this chapter indicate that there are politically viable alternatives to 
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market reforms that provide a greater linkage to improving growth potential than 
the market reforms themselves do.  This does not imply that free-market ideals 
are undesirable in the Latin American context, but it does indicate that there are 
better, less politically contentious ways, to get the process started.  While this 
chapter has shown the close alignment between targeted social spending and 
growth potential in both Latin American subregions, Chapter II will examine the 
central role social spending played in the initial adoption of neoliberal reforms 













III. THE INFLUENCE OF NEGOTIATION AND TARGETED 
SOCIAL SPENDING ON NEOLIBERAL STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA (1970–2000) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It is a common assumption that bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Latin 
America have been better able to absorb the political costs of implementing 
neoliberal economic reforms than their democratic counterparts.48  Despite this 
assumption, it is clear that several democracies have implemented neoliberal 
reforms, and several (for example:  Argentina, Peru, and Brazil) have done so 
with popular support (at least initially in Brazil).49  The Venezuelan government, 
on the other hand, attempted to implement orthodox reforms and was met with 
massive street protests, and the policies were eventually reversed.50  In the case 
of Chile, the military dictatorship was capable of repressing any resistance to the 
economic reforms among the lower classes, and there was strong popular 
support among the middle sectors for implementation of a neoliberal program.  
Nevertheless, the Pinochet government had to make several concessions in 
program implementation in response to public backlash.51  What factors allowed 
for both democratic and authoritarian governments to successfully implement 
reform programs?  Were the economic policies implemented by the various 
regime types all orthodox, “Washington Consensus” type reforms, or was there 
variation in the policy enactment that could account for the variation in the 
                                            
48 For examples of this line of thinking see:  David Pion-Berlin, “Political Repression and 
Economic Doctrines,” Comparative Political Studies 16, no. 1 (Apr. 1983): 37–66; John Sheahan, 
Patterns of Development in Latin America: Poverty, Repression, and Economic Strategy 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1987); Glen Biglaiser and Helen Kellogg Institute for 
International Studies, Guardians of the Nation? : Economists, Generals, and Economic Reform in 
Latin America (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002). 
49 Kurt Weyland, The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru, and Venezuela (Princeton, N.J; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2004), 1–2. 
50 Kurt Weyland, “The Rise of Latin America’s Two Lefts: Insights from Rentier State 
Theory,” Comparative Politics 41, no. 2 (Jan. 2009): 149. 
51 Marcus Kurtz, “State Developmentalism without a Developmental State: The Public 
Foundations of the “Free Market Miracle” in Chile,” Latin American Politics and Society 43, no. 2 
(Summer 2001): 1–3. 
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popular response?  Finally, what influence did external factors, such as systemic 
economic shocks and International Monetary Fund (IMF) program prescriptions, 
have on internal strategies for reform implementation? 
First, I argue that bureaucratic authoritarian (BA) regimes also had to 
make concessions to their populations when enacting reforms, and the process 
led to package implementation that was much less orthodox than is typically 
assumed.  I follow O’Donnell and define BA regimes as “systems that are 
excluding and emphatically non-democratic.”52 Also, following O’Donnell, I 
characterize the system as comprised of high-level technocrats and the military 
who work in conjunction with foreign capital to maximize industrialization.53  
Examples of prototypical BA regimes are Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay during 
the military regimes and Mexico during the technocratic period of rule by the 
Partido Revolutionario Institucional (PRI).54 Second, I argue that through 
negotiations or concessions, democracies in Latin America were actually better 
able to implement reform programs than their authoritarian counterparts.  The 
key policy tool used by both regime types to ease the political costs of reform 
implementation was targeted social spending to counteract the negative 
externalities generated by the reforms—this is the central finding of this chapter.  
In other words, both democratic and authoritarian regimes used targeted social 
spending to overcome popular resistance to the reform programs, and this 
targeted social spending was crucial to ensuring the policies were not reversed.  
 I also argue that where natural resource wealth is abundant, governments 
can more easily roll back reform programs, especially when met with strong 
                                            
52 David Collier, “Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model,” in The New 
Authoritarianism in Latin America, eds. David Collier, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Joint 
Committee on Latin American Studies (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1979), 24–25.  
For BA in the original context see:  Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-
Authoritarianism; Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 
University of California, 1973). 
53 Collier, Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model, 24. 
54 PRI rule does not nicely fit the BA model in that the role of the military differed in Mexico 
than in Chile, Argentina, or Uruguay.  Nevertheless, the behaviors exuded by the PRI seem to 
closely follow those undertaken by the more prototypical BA regimes. 
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popular resistance.  In other words, natural resource wealth allows governments 
to bypass the negotiation routes undertaken by the other countries.  This was 
particularly true in the case of oil producing countries, as other forms of natural 
resource wealth were found to be statistically insignificant.  I also rule out other 
potential internal explanations for reform acceptance, such as high inflation, 
unemployment, or levels of violence.  Finally, I find that the IMF and the United 
States did not play a significant role in the development strategies undertaken by 
these countries, despite common assumptions to the contrary.  Moreover, 
external economic shocks that could affect internal reform strategies were also 
not statistically significant. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before looking at potential answers found by other scholars concerning 
the questions asked in this chapter it is important to remember what neoliberal 
reforms are in the first place.  In Chapter I, I provided a thorough description of 
neoliberal reforms in the form of John Williamson’s “Washington Consensus”55 
and Dani Rodrik’s “Augmented Washington Consensus.”56  For determination as 
to whether a reform package was orthodox or not, I am primarily concerned with 
the original Washington Consensus here, however, Rodrik’s inclusion of targeted 
social spending as a primary component in his Augmented Washington 
Consensus provides the impetus for its inclusion as a key determinate in this 
chapter. 
The common assumption among early scholarly work on the process of 
economic reform implementation in Latin America is that political repression is 
necessary to implement orthodox reforms.  Pion-Berlin argues that business 
elites and politicians form alliances with international institutions like the IMF to 
repress the population to facilitate the implementation of reforms.57  Pion-Berlin’s 
                                            
55 Williamson and Institute for International Economics (U.S.), Latin American Adjustment. 
56 Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes, 17. 
57 Pion-Berlin, Political Repression and Economic Doctrines, 37–66. 
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study is limited in scope, however, to Argentina over a 23 year period and may 
lack applicability to the rest of the region.  Further, Pion-Berlin tends to discount 
the staying power of reforms during the periods when Argentina was a 
democracy. 
Along this same line, John Sheahan presents a logic based argument and 
offers significant evidence that repressive regimes should have an easier time 
implementing reforms.58  However, Sheahan tends to over-weight the case of 
Chile, while under-weighting the cases of neoliberal policy reforms in 
democracies.  Further, as Glen Biglaiser shows, there was wide variation in the 
capabilities of military regimes to implement orthodox reforms, and many 
countries were worse off in varying ways after the reforms were implemented.59  
Because Sheahan wrote contemporaneously with many Latin American 
countries’ implementation of neoliberal reforms in democracies, he is most likely 
missing several cases that would have altered his argument. 
In democracies, Kurt Weyland details the negotiations that take place 
between the population and the government when reform programs are 
implemented.60  Weyland relies on a synthesis of psychological and political 
economy arguments, but does not examine how bureaucratic authoritarian 
regimes also have to make concessions to the people to remain legitimate.  
Additionally, Weyland tends to lump all reforms together as orthodox, and there 
was actually quite a large variation among the reform policies implemented 
throughout the region. 
Fear and uncertainty can also play an important role in the acceptance of 
painful economic policy implementation by the general population, and several 
authors have explored various factors that can lead to fear and uncertainty and 
thus a greater propensity to accept neoliberalism.  Cristina Rojas shows that 
                                            
58 Sheahan, Patterns of Development in Latin America. 
59 Biglaiser and Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Guardians of the Nation? 
60 Weyland, The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies. 
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neoliberalism in Colombia was implemented in an attempt to modify structural 
conditions that were influencing the civil war there.61  Although she was 
specifically writing about Colombia, similar arguments could be made about other 
countries with insurgencies (Peru for example).  In situations where the populace 
fears for their safety they may be more willing to accept the externalities from an 
orthodox reform strategy than they would be otherwise.  Thus, the influence of 
political violence preceding structural reforms should be controlled for. 
Kurt Weyland adds that in addition to the physical fear of political violence, 
economic fear and uncertainty can influence a population’s willingness to accept 
economic liberalization.62  This is particularly true for periods of wide swings in 
unemployment and inflation which can lead to fear and uncertainty, especially 
during periods of hyperinflation such as those that were pervasive throughout the 
region.  Unfortunately, Weyland’s evaluations are limited to a few countries and 
he ignores periods of military rule.  This chapter fills in this gap by examining 
policy implementation in 17 Latin American countries, and by including both 
democracies and authoritarian governments. 
Another contribution from Weyland leads us to understand that natural 
resource endowments matter.63  He argues that oil wealth influenced the type of 
leftist regime that appeared in response to the neoliberal reforms that preceded 
them; however, he does not specifically address the ability of states to implement 
reforms in the first place.  Weyland’s argument also suggests that natural 
resource wealth matters when it comes to the ability of the state to tax their 
people in order to sustain painful orthodox reforms.  Weyland looks specifically at 
oil wealth, but in Latin America there is a wide variety of natural resource wealth 
 
                                            
61 Cristina Rojas, “Colombia’s Neoliberal Regime of Governance: Securitization by 
Dispossession,” in Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas, eds. Laura Macdonald and Anne Ruckert 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 233. 
62 Kurt Weyland, “Swallowing the Bitter Pill: Sources of Popular Support for Neoliberal 
Reform in Latin America,” Comparative Political Studies 31, no. 5 (Oct. 1998): 539–568; 
Weyland, The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies. 
63 Weyland, The Rise of Latin America’s Two Lefts, 145–164. 
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endowments, thus it is necessary to test for both primary commodities exports 
generally and oil exports specifically to weigh the influence of each as a possible 
independent variable. 
Contrary to popular arguments about the influence of the United States 
and the IMF in the adaption of neoliberal reforms, Javier Corrales finds that 
internal politics played a much more central role in policy choices.64 Miguel 
Centeno also minimizes the influence of external actors on neoliberal policy 
choices in Mexico.65  For example, Centeno emphasizes that Mexico “enjoyed a 
surprising degree of sovereignty in dealing with its internal challenges.”66  
Nevertheless, Mexico under Salinas actually moved much closer to the United 
States, regardless of the reasons behind it. Thus, it is important not to completely 
neglect external influences, and IMF loans will serve as an independent variable 
to control for the potential influence of external actors.  This is based on the 
assumption that countries receiving IMF loans would be more likely to implement 
IMF and U.S. policy prescriptions. 
Much of the current work in Latin America ignores the question of how the 
policies were implemented and instead focuses on the positive and negative 
effects of these policies.67  The unexpected “left-turn” in Latin America has 
redirected the focus of scholars studying the region from looking at how 
programs are implemented to examining the effects of the reforms after the 
                                            
64 Javier Corrales, “Market Reforms,” in Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin 
America, eds. Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2003). 
65 Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico 
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994). 
66 Ibid., 71. 
67 For example see:  Kurt Weyland, “Assessing Latin American Neoliberalism: Introduction to 
a Debate,” Latin American Research Review 39, no. 3 (2004): 143–149; Evelyne Huber and Fred 
Solt, “Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism,” Latin American Research Review 39, no. 3 
(2004): 150–164; Michael Walton, “Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good, Bad, or Incomplete?” 
Latin American Research Review 39, no. 3 (2004): 165–183; Moises Arce and Paul Bellinger, 
“Low-Intensity Democracy Revisited: The Effects of Economic Liberalization on Political Activity in 
Latin America,” World Politics 60, no. 1 (2007): 97–121. 
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fact.68  While the effects of neoliberalism are important, understanding the means 
to which they are implemented is also crucial.  This aspect has been neglected in 
recent scholarship in light of the severe political and electoral backlash, and this 
chapter seeks to reverse this trend. 
C. DATA, HYPOTHESIS, AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Data 
Economic data, including Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
growth, inflation (GDP deflator), unemployment (percent of unemployed adults), 
the use of IMF credit, and resource dependence (commodity exports and oil 
rents as a percentage of GDP) come from the World Bank.  By using a 
standardized source the economic data, continuity of methodology is assured.  
Although much of this data is also available from the IMF, the World Bank data 
set is larger and covers the entire period of the study, 1970–2000.69 
Democratization and durability scores come from the Polity IV dataset.70  
Polity IV has created some contentiousness over their methodology and 
consistency.  The alternative measure, the Freedom House index has also 
received similar scrutiny.71  Nevertheless, Polity IV is commonly used throughout 
political science literature.  Along with the actual Polity IV score, I also create a 
dummy variable for democratization with a score of one meaning democracy and 
a zero meaning authoritarian government.  This dummy variable is generated for 
three alternative cutoff points prevalent in the literature.  They are:  Polity IV 
greater than zero, Polity IV greater than or equal to seven, and Polity IV greater 
than or equal to eight.  This cutoff point is of significant concern given this data 
 
                                            
68 See, for example:  Weyland, The Rise of Latin America’s Two Lefts, 145–164. 
69 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (1960–2010) (Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 2011). 
70 Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2010 (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2011). 
71 Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: 
Evaluating Alternative Indices,” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 1 (Feb. 2002): 5–34. 
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set.  There are 87 data points where the Polity IV score is greater than zero but 
less than eight, and there are 55 data points where the Polity IV score is either a 
seven or an eight. 
Data on liberalization come from the dataset generated by Hubert Escaith 
and Igor Paunovic that is an expansion of an earlier dataset generated by 
Samuel Morley et al.72  This dataset is widely used by Latin American scholars to 
explore the levels of neoliberal reforms implemented at various times and 
places.73  Unfortunately, this dataset is limited to the time period 1970–2000 and 
to 17 Latin American and Caribbean countries.  The time period is acceptable 
because the vast majority of neoliberal reforms were implemented during this 
period, and I am focused on initial implementation and not the backlash.  The 17 
countries included in the dataset include all of the largest economies, but exclude 
countries that have had economic difficulties during the period of the study such 
as Cuba and Haiti.  The exclusion of these countries may skew the data 
somewhat, but all of the largest economies are included and is deemed to be 
sufficient.  Further, there is limited data available on the excluded countries, and 
unfortunately they most likely would have had to have been excluded anyway.  
The liberalization dataset has indices for commercial and capital account 
liberalization, as well as indices for privatization and tax reform.  Escaith and 
Paunovic combine the scores together for a total liberalization score that is either 
a simple average of the other scores, or a combination of a weighted factor 
analysis of the other scores.  These scores have a range from zero to one and 
are measured out two decimal places.  I run the regressions on both. 
                                            
72 Hubert Escaith and Igor Paunovic, Reformas Estructurales En América Latina y El Caribe 
Enel Período 1970–2000: Índices y Notas Metodológicas (Santiago, Chile: Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2004); Samuel A. Morley, Roberto Machado 
and Stefano Pettinato, Indexes of Structural Reform in Latin America (Santiago, Chile: Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1999). 
73 For example see:  Arce and Bellinger, Low-Intensity Democracy Revisited, 102. 
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Missing unemployment data from the World Bank is filled in by a recent 
IMF Working Paper on unemployment rates in the region.74  The methodologies 
used by this study mirror the approaches taken by the World Bank and are thus a 
valid substitute for the missing data.  Unfortunately, there would have been too 
many missing data points to make the regression analysis useful without 
including this additional dataset. 
Data on violence come from the University of Maryland’s Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management’s “Global Terrorism 
Database.”  Despite its name, this expansive database contains all incidence of 
intrastate violence.  This database is widely used in the conflict and terrorism 
literature and is supported and maintained by academics using a consistent 
approach that does not vary over time.  This database does not include incidents 
that are deemed to have been perpetrated by state actors; nevertheless, a close 
examination of the data has determined that trends in violence by all actors have 
tended to move together.  In other words, the number of violent incidents 
occurring during a given year can serve as a useful proxy for overall levels of 
violence in a country.75 
Finally, data on social spending as a percentage of GDP come from the 
Evelyn Huber et al. database on politics and social spending in Latin America.  
This data is a combination of government spending on Health, Education, Social 
Security, and various other social welfare programs within a country.  Although 




                                            
74 Laurence Ball, Nicolás De Roux and Marc Hofstetter, IMF Working Paper 11/252: 
Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, DC: International Monetary 
Fund,[2011]). 
75 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
Global Terrorism Database [Data File: Globalterrorismdb_0611dist.Xlsx] (College Park, Maryland: 
University of Maryland, 2011). 
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most complete dataset regarding social spending in Latin America, and without it 
the regressions performed here (and the subsequent findings) would not have 
been possible.76 
2. Hypothesis2 
All governments, regardless of regime type, had to make concessions to 
their populations during periods of economic reform, but democratic regimes 
were better able to negotiate and thus implemented more orthodox type reforms. 
3. General Model 
 
        
      
1 1Re 4 4 t t
i
Neo f Pol Pol Dur Un Un
Soc Vio GDP IMF COM OIL C
 (Eqn. 3.1) 
 
where: NeoRef  = Neoliberal Reform (Simple Average or Weighted Factor 
  Score)77 
 Pol4  = Dummy variable for Democratization based on Polity IV 
  score78 
 Pol4Dur  = The Polity IV score durability in years 
 π = Inflation 
 πt-1 = Inflation during the previous period 
 Un = Unemployment Rate 
 Unt-1 = Unemployment Rate during the previous period 
 Soc = The level of targeted social spending as a percentage  
  of GDP 
 Vio = The number of incidences of violence occurring during  
  the year 
 GDP = Real growth in GDP per capita  
 IMF  = Amount of IMF funding received during the year 
 COM = Commodities exports as a percentage of GDP 
 OIL = Oil rents as a percentage of GDP 
 Ci = Constant 
                                            
76 Evelyne Huber et al., Social Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean Dataset, 1960–
2006 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina, 2008). 
77 The simple average of the Escaith and Paunovic scores are used for models Simple 
Average 1–6, and the weighted factor scores are used for models Weighted Factors 1–6. 
78 When denoted as (P4 Score) the actual Polity IV numeric score is used in the model.  
Similarly, (P4>0), (P4≥7), and (P4≥8) are used to denote the models where dummy variables are 
used to test for the effects of varying levels of democratization. 
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The model is deductively determined based on the internal and external 
independent variables seen as important in the literature.  As the primary 
purpose of this chapter is to test for the influence of regime type on structural 
reform implementation, the model provides a means to test Hypothesis2 while 
controlling for all other variables seen as significant, thus providing for results 
that show the independent influence of regime type on reform implementation 
and acceptance. 
4. Methodology 
The model is tested for all variables using Minitab16 software to perform 
ordinary least square (OLS) regressions.  Regressions are performed first using 
a simple average of the Escaith and Paunovic liberalization scores as the 
dependent variables, then the regressions are run again using a weighted factor 
analysis of the Escaith and Paunovic scores that takes into account variances in 
the importance in each factor with regards to generating economic growth 
(weighted factors).  For each set of regressions the various cutoff points for 
measuring democracy via Polity IV scores is substituted into each subsequent 
model.  This results in a set of four models and four regressions run, thus 
covering every possible combination.  The results of the OLS regressions for the 
simple average and weighted factors are reported in Tables 5 and 6, 
respectively.  Finally, independent variables that were determined to be 
statistically insignificant in Tables 2 and 3 are dropped and the regressions ran 
again without them.  The results of the final four models and regressions are 
reported in Table 7. 
D. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
As Tables 7 to 9 show, there was a high statistical significance (at the 
99 percent level) that democracies were able to implement neoliberal reforms 
that were closer to the orthodox model than authoritarian regimes.  This held 
regardless of the cutoff point chosen to determine whether a regime was 
democratic or not, and the sign on the coefficient was positive in all cases.  The 
 44 
coefficient on the Polity IV score variable for models Simple Average 1 and 
Weighted Factors 1 is particularly enlightening in this regard.  For example, in the 
Weighted Factors 1 model, for every 1 point increase in the Polity IV score 
(range -10 to 10) the ability of a regime to implement neoliberal reforms would 
rise by .01 points or one percent of the maximum value—holding all else 
constant.  For the models using dummy variables to measure democracy the 
interpretation of the results are even straighter forward and more powerful.  As 
an example, in the model Weighted Factors 2 (P4>0) there is a .14 point increase 
in the ability of a country to implement reforms when that country is a democracy.  
These results clearly show that Weyland’s findings on market reforms in 
democracies79 hold throughout all of Latin America, and democratization actually 
aids in neoliberal reform implementation contrary to earlier pro-authoritarianism 
arguments.80  Finally, although not statistically significant in all of the simple 
average models, the Polity IV durability score was highly statistically significant 
(at the 99 percent level) in all of the weighted factors models and the sign on the 
coefficient was positive but small.  It appears from these results that the longevity 
of regime type also matters when it comes to reform implementation, but due to 
the low values on the coefficients and variation in statistical significance across 








                                            
79 Weyland, The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies. 
80 This is also consistent with the findings of Centeno on Mexico but extended to the entire 









Variable Simple Avg. 1 
(P4 Score) 
Simple Avg. 2 
(P4>0) 
Simple Avg. 3 
(P4≥7) 
Simple Avg. 4 
(P4≥8) 
Constant 0.53781*** 0.53781*** 0.55871*** 0.56819*** 
 (16.19) (16.19) (16.82) (15.97) 
Polity IV Score 0.008379*** 0.11666*** 0.10860*** 0.04122** 
 (6.15) (5.96) (5.76) (2.06) 
Polity IV Durability -0.0010358** -0.0008042 -0.0011389** -0.0006363 
 (-2.10) (-1.65) (-2.27) (-1.21) 
Inflation -0.00000774 -0.00001000 -0.00001619 0.00000735 
 (-0.29) (-0.38) (-0.60) (0.26) 
Inflation (t-1) -0.00000826 -0.00000738 -0.00000809 -0.00000576 
 (-0.79) (-0.71) (-0.77) (-0.52) 
Unemployment 0.003361 0.002986 0.000553 0.003513 
 (0.73) (0.65) (0.12) (0.72) 
Unemployment (t-1) -0.001997 -0.001875 -0.000308 -0.001629 
 (-0.44) (-0.41) (-0.07) (-0.34) 
Social Spending 0.003394* 0.004069** 0.002948* 0.002639 
 (1.83) (2.18) (1.57) (1.30) 
Violence -0.00015300** -0.00015911** -0.00014548* -0.00008114 
 (-2.03) (-2.10) (-1.92) (-1.02) 
GDP Growth 0.002627 0.002814 0.002129 0.003335 
 (1.24) (1.32) 0.99) (1.48) 
Use of IMF Credit -0.03318* -0.02287 -0.01680 -0.01652 
 (-1.69) (-1.17) (-0.86) (-0.80) 
Exports (%GDP) 0.0021042** 0.0021531** 0.0029034*** 0.003191*** 
 (2.12) (2.16) (2.98) (3.02) 
Oil Rents -0.007768*** -0.007061** -0.007617*** -0.006793*** 
 (-6.54) (-6.03) (-6.38) (-5.34) 
Adjusted R
2
 27.0% 26.4% 25.8% 17.5% 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01     
Table 7.   Regressions of Neoliberal Reform (Simple Average) on 























Constant 0.41446*** 0.33049*** 0.35272*** 0.37550*** 
 (10.36) (8.19) (8.86) (8.62) 
Polity IV Score 0.011149*** 0.14424*** 0.14460*** 0.07757*** 
 (7.84) (6.93) (7.34) (3.59) 
Polity IV Durability 0.003375*** 0.003612*** 0.003120*** 0.003472*** 
 (3.21) (3.36) (2.92) (3.00) 
Inflation 0.00000038 -0.00000083 -0.00001064 0.00001685 
 (0.01) (-0.03) (-0.38) (0.56) 
Inflation (t-1) -0.00000512 -0.00000343 -0.00000504 -0.00000322 
 (-0.47) (-0.31) (-0.46) (-0.27) 
Unemployment 0.000615 0.000150 -0.003078 0.000791 
 (0.13) (0.03) (-0.61) (0.15) 
Unemployment (t-1) 0.000643 0.000688 -0.002952 0.001333 
 (0.13) (0.14) (-0.60) (0.25) 
Social Spending 0.007118*** 0.007998*** 0.006346*** 0.005329** 
 (3.57) (3.91) (3.13) (2.37) 
Violence -0.0002362*** -0.0002334*** -0.0002248*** -0.00013228 
 (2.98) (-2.87) (-2.80) (-1.54) 
GDP Growth 0.000893 0.001362 0.000169 0.001613 
 (0.39) (0.58) (0.07) (0.64) 
Use of IMF Credit 0.01882 0.03269 0.04037* 0.03727 
 (0.93) (1.42) (1.77) (1.51) 
Exports (%GDP) 0.005768*** 0.005830*** 0.006915*** 0.006908*** 
 (4.59) (4.50) (5.53) (5.00) 
Oil Rents -0.008279*** -0.007181*** -0.008111*** -0.007369*** 
 (-6.63) (-5.72) (-6.42) (-5.33) 
Adjusted R
2
 41.8% 38.9% 40.1% 29.8% 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01     
Table 8.   Regressions of Neoliberal Reform (Weighted Factors) on 
Hypothesized Determinates (1970–2000) 
Interestingly, the following variables were shown in prior literature to be 
significant influences in neoliberal reform implementation but were not found to 
be statistically significant here.  Variables influencing an individual’s level of 
economic fear were not statistically significant in any of the models.  These 
include inflation and unemployment rates in the current and preceding year, as 
well as the overall economic situation facing an economy in the form of real GDP 
per capita growth.  Also statistically insignificant in nearly all models81 were 
external factors incentivizing countries to implement neoliberal reforms such as 
                                            
81 In two models, there appeared to be some statistical significance at the 90 percent level, 
but the coefficients were incredibly low and contributed little to the models overall.  
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IMF funds.  It appears from these results that internal factors, such as levels of 
democratic representation, played a much larger role in influencing governments 
to undertake reforms than encouragement from external entities like the IMF or 
United States. 
Looking at the models in Tables 7 and 8, it becomes clear that there is a 
significant drop in R-squared values between the models that used a Polity IV 
score less than or equal to seven and the models that used a Polity IV score less 
than or equal to eight.  Statistical significance of the explanatory variables does 
not change when choosing either cutoff point, but it seems that seven is the 
cutoff point that provides the highest overall explanatory power for the models.  
Table 9 shows results for the final four models which drop the statistically 
insignificant variables and use Polity IV scores of greater than or equal to seven 
as the cutoff point for the dummy variables.  Also carried forward to the Table 9 
models is the violence variable. 
 
Variable Simple Avg. 5 
(P4 Score) 








Constant 0.52586*** 0.49099*** 0.37166*** 0.32130*** 
 (23.32) (23.47) (13.02) /12.18) 
Polity IV Score 0.007724*** 0.13495*** 0.011364*** 0.19174*** 
 (6.82) (8.98) (8.82) (11.53) 
Polity IV Durability -0.0003534 -0.008461** 0.0028282*** 0.0018338** 
 (-0.84) (-2.05) (3.72) (2.56) 
Social Spending 0.007941*** 0.006018*** 0.01593*** 0.012158*** 
 (4.99) (3.85) (8.26) (6.93) 
Violence -0.00006990 -0.00007262 -0.00010959* -0.00011131* 
 (-1.21) (-1.31) (-1.68) (-1.83) 
Exports (%GDP) 0.0012591 0.0020756*** 0.0029130*** 0.0009031*** 
 (1.59) (2.83) (2.96) (4.84) 
Oil Rents -0.004588*** -0.005833*** -0.004359*** -0.006111*** 
 (-4.47) (-5.78) (-3.75) (-5.46) 
Adjusted R
2
 24.1% 30.0% 36.6% 44.2% 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01     
Table 9.   Regressions of Neoliberal Reform (Dropped Variables) on 
Hypothesized Determinates (1970–2000) 
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The results for the violence variable were particularly confusing and 
cannot be easily explained away.  First, levels of violence were shown to be 
statistically significant in six of the eight initial models and the sign on the 
coefficient was negative.  This poses a challenge to the literature that finds fear 
from violence will allow a regime to implement reforms more easily.  Looking a 
little closer however and the insignificance of the coefficient values is somewhat 
more apparent.  The coefficient values may have been negative, but they are 
very small, meaning that for an increase in the level of violence by one event the 
ability to implement reforms would decrease by an order of magnitude in the 
10,000ths range.  This is very small compared to the other significant factors.  
Put another way, you would need 1000 violent events to occur during a year just 
to decrease the ability of a government to implement reforms by one percent.  
Perhaps in extremely violent situations governments become unable to focus on 
reforms programs and instead must focus on dealing with the violence.  This 
could account for the unexpected results, but without further evidence, this is 
only speculative at best.  Due to the statistical significance in the first eight 
models, levels of violence data are included in the final four models, and the final 
results are only statistically significant in two of the models and only then at the 
90 percent level.  Thus, the significance of levels of violence influencing 
neoliberal reforms is highly questionable. 
Exports of commodities were found to be statistically significant with a 
positive sign on the coefficient, but a relatively small value.  This is interesting 
considering that oil rents were also found to be highly statistically significant but 
with a negative sign on the coefficient.  It would appear that Weyland’s 
assessment of oil wealth’s impact on reform implementation82 is accurate and 
can be more broadly applied in this case.  Further, the positive sign on the 
general commodities exports variable is consistent with the Latin American 
context.  Despite a large dependency on primary product exports (not including 
oil), most Latin American countries’ exports are relatively diverse, with no single 
                                            
82 Weyland, The Rise of Latin America’s Two Lefts, 145–164. 
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commodity making up more than ten percent of GDP.  A couple of possible 
exceptions are Chilean copper that comes in at 10.1 percent of GDP and at times 
comprised over 80 percent of the country’s exports, and Mexican oil that 
comprised nearly 80 percent of exports in the 1980s.83  Further, in the oil 
exporting countries, oil rents make up a significantly large percentage of the 
country’s GDP.  For example, oil rents made up nearly 50 percent of Venezuela’s 
GDP in 1979.  This was down to 25 percent by 2000, but clearly oil rents play a 
significant role in Venezuela’s economy and sales of fuel in general still account 
for nearly 90 percent of Venezuela’s exports.84  Thus, where there was significant 
oil wealth, countries were less prone to implement orthodox reform agendas—
holding all else equal. 
Finally, and most importantly, targeted social spending was clearly used to 
allow countries to implement more orthodox neoliberal reforms than they would 
have otherwise been able to impose.  This shows that in both authoritarian and 
democratic regimes reforms that are more orthodox were implemented simply by 
compensating for some of the negative externalities generated by the reform 
programs.  This is in spite of (or in addition to) any normative value intrinsic to 
increased social spending   In Latin America, social spending was used to 
compensate or co-opt the masses into accepting the reform packages.  Social 
spending remained targeted and was not broad-based, thus the reforms were still 
neoliberal in the “Augmented Washington Consensus” sense, and Rodrik’s 
inclusion of targeted social spending85 certainly makes the implementation of the 
rest of the reforms easier. 
The magnitude of the influence of targeted social spending on reform 
acceptance was also substantial—the tradeoff is nearly one for one.  For 
                                            
83 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (1960–2010). 
84 Ibid. 
85 Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes, 17. 
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example, using the Weighted Factor 6 model,86 for an increase in social spending 
by one percent of GDP liberalization is able to rise by over .01.  Remembering 
that .01 is one percent of the possible maximum value of the liberalization index 
and the influence of social spending on liberalization becomes apparent.  This is 
a significant finding for a region like Latin America because there is vast room for 
improvement with regards to social spending levels.  For example, of the 
countries examined in this study, only Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and at times 
Brazil, Jamaica, and Bolivia had social spending levels greater than ten percent 
of GDP.87  This is paltry compared to the social spending in the highly successful 
social democracies of Northern Europe, such as Sweden with spending levels 
over 30 percent of GDP during this same time period.88  Interestingly, with the 
highest levels of social spending in the region, Chile’s spending actually rose to 
just over twenty percent of GDP during the second half of the military regime89 
lending additional evidence to my argument that even authoritarian regimes had 
to compensate for the negative externalities generated by the reforms with social 
spending. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Despite the common assumption that authoritarian regimes would have an 
easier time implementing neoliberal reforms in Latin America, this chapter has 
shown that neither regime type was able to fully implement the reforms they 
desired without making some concessions—thus, even authoritarian regimes 
need some degree of legitimacy.  Neoliberal policy reforms implemented in Latin 
America were not uniform in level or duration, but varied in intensity due to the 
situation in the country where they were to be imposed.  Popular support for 
reforms was won through two separate but equally important means:  negotiation 
                                            
86 This is probably the best model; every factor is statistically significant and it explains over 
44 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. 
87 Huber et al., Social Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean Dataset, 1960–2006. 
88 William Adema, Net Social Expenditure (2nd Edition, OECD Labour Market and Social 
Policy Occasional Paper. no. 52 (Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2001). 
89 Huber et al., Social Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean Dataset, 1960–2006. 
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and compensation or co-option.  Both authoritarian regimes and democracies 
were forced to moderate their reform goals in response to popular resistance and 
either decreased the levels of reforms implemented or compensated certain 
sectors for structural adjustments with targeted social spending.  Further, other 
potential influences on reform implementation seen in the literature, including 
economic and political fears and external influences from the IMF and United 
States, were found to be unimportant and statistically insignificant. 
The most salient finding of this chapter is that the inclusion of targeted 
social spending and the expansion of social safety nets in the “Augmented 
Washington Consensus” provide a broader set of policy tools to ease the political 
costs of neoliberal reform implementation.  This chapter has shown just how 
large a role social spending can play in easing the political costs of structural 
reforms.  Social spending, along with anti-corruption and good governance 
reforms, can lessen the blow to the people while simultaneously improving levels 
of democratic representation and social equality.  The implementation of reforms 
is as much about the ability of a government to bring along the people as it is 
about getting the reforms right in the first place. 
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IV. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INCREASED POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA (1996–2008) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
American journalists, diplomats, and leaders across the political spectrum 
have frequently commented on the association between a lack of development 
and political violence, especially in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.90  This 
somewhat simplistic argument appeals to the Western capitalistic ideals of 
wealth attainment and can be restated as:  political violence (in this case 
terrorism) happens because people are frustrated with their inability to provide for 
the basic needs of their families, and high unemployment gives them the free 
time to participate in the violence.  This is by no means a new argument.  During 
the Cold War, development was seen as a way to fend off the threat of 
communist revolution, and after the Cold War, a more nuanced approach argued 
that development would eliminate one of the major causes of civil war and ethnic 
conflict. It thus appears on the surface that the popular arguments for 
development programs have shifted with the political climate and the headlines 
that run contemporaneously with them.  Despite this appearance, there is a 
common theme amongst these arguments:  a lack of development (poverty) 
leads to political violence in one form or another. But, what about the other way 
around?  Does economic growth, and the associated increase in inequality seen 
in Latin America, lead to increases in political violence? 
Most recent scholarly work finds little to no evidence of a link between 
poverty and political violence.  However, in an effort to provide universal theories 
for the causes of violence, most of the scholarly work has looked at the data 
                                            
90 For examples from both sides of the political spectrum in the United States see: George 
W. Bush, “Statement by the President of the United States of America at the International 
Conference on Financing for Development; Monterrey, Mexico; 22 Mar. 2002,” 
http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/usaE.htm (accessed 10 Aug. 2011); Hillary Clinton, “Statement 
by the Secretary of State on Development in the 21st Century; Washington, D.C; 6 January 
2010,” Remarks to the Center for Global Development, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/134838.htm (accessed 10 Aug. 2011). 
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through a global lens.  This has tended to completely eliminate regional variation 
in the statistical models.  Because of this, much of the statistical work has 
provided little explanatory value to scholars.  Many explanations for the causes of 
political violence that will be explored in the literature review have been 
eliminated through the “universe of data,” and very few potential causes have 
gotten past the regression analysis.  This chapter seeks to reverse this trend.  By 
focusing on a single region for the statistical analysis, data skewing due to 
regional variation can be reduced and nearly eliminated. 
Latin America provides the ideal location to begin this re-examination of 
the data.  The region is relatively large geographically, provides for adequate 
variation across the hemisphere, and has had numerous examples of political 
violence during the period of study.  Controlling for education level, population 
size, good governance, and even democratization, incidence of political violence 
actually increase in Latin America as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
increases.  The data also show that this is made all the more significant when 
there is a simultaneous rise in unemployment and income distribution becomes 
more skewed.  Thus, I argue that development programs can inadvertently 
create a perfect trifecta of economic causes of political violence when they are 
implemented in such a way that income increases per capita overall, but 
unemployment in the sectors hurt by the development program increases, and 
the economic gains are focused in a higher concentration among the rich.  It 
should be noted up front that the models presented in this chapter are not robust 
and have relatively low R-squared values, but the factors just outlined are all 
statistically significant at the 95 percent level at a minimum.  To put it plainly—
contrary to popular arguments, economic development in Latin America has 
actually led to a higher incidence of political violence because the economic 
gains have not been shared evenly, and there have not been adequate social 
safety nets to help those who have been negatively affected by the development 
programs. 
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B. EXPLANATIONS FOR CAUSES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE:  A BRIEF 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The explanations for the causes of all political violence can be roughly 
grouped into four categories:  economy, good governance (democracy, voice and 
accountability, lack of corruption), education, and population variation (ethnicity, 
religion, culture).  Nicholas Sambanis examines the similarities and differences 
between terrorism and civil war and finds that the same mechanisms underlie the 
phenomena we call terrorism and civil war and thus these phenomena are not 
causally distinct.91  Along these lines, civil war and terrorism are often analyzed 
separately in the literature because of limitations in the datasets available, and 
the arguments here are similarly limited by the available datasets.  Nevertheless, 
I repeat the regressions using both terrorism and civil war data sets with similar 
results. Thus, Sambanis’s findings appear to hold for Latin America.  Much 
research into political violence however, does not make effort to test their 
findings in multiple contexts.  Therefore, where possible, the findings of others 
are reported in their original context, but the implications of the findings are 
assumed to hold for all forms of political violence unless shown otherwise.  
 Ethnicity and religion, as causes of political violence, have been studied 
extensively since September 11, 2001, but most of the academic work has found 
little link between variations in ethnicity and religion and political violence.  
Fearon and Laitin find that the causes of civil war depend on whether the 
conditions on the ground support an insurgency and are not due to ethnic or 
religious diversity.  Further, their work eliminates the end of the Cold War as a 
potential cause of civil war and political violence.92 They seek a global 
explanation for political violence in the form of civil war and may be missing some 
regional variation as a result.  Paul Collier goes a step further and finds that 
                                            
91 Nicholas Sambanis, “Terrorism and Civil War,” in Terrorism, Economic Development, and 
Political Openness, eds. Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
174–206. 
92 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The 
American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (Feb. 2003): 75–90. 
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ethnic and religious diversity actually reduces the risk of civil conflict.93  In spite of 
Fearon, Laitin, and Colliers findings, it is extremely difficult to independently test 
for ethnic diversity as a potential cause (in and of itself) for political violence in 
Latin America, because the population in the region is predominately divided 
along economic and social lines that run parallel to the individual’s ethnic or 
cultural identity.  Thus, the influence of inequality as an independent variable 
cannot be seen as independent to ethnic or cultural causes of violence in Latin 
America. 
Arguments that low levels of education lead to political violence initially 
followed the same lines as property crime theory.  Under these arguments, lower 
levels of education are associated with lower levels of wages and thus an 
economic propensity to commit property crime.94 The academic leap from 
property crime to political violence has been virtually impossible, but arguments 
in the popular press have persisted espousing the supposed link.  Krueger and 
Maleckova find no correlation between level of education and terrorism when 
performing a study using the universe of incidents of terrorism.95  A more 
nuanced approach is taken by Cragin and Chalk from the RAND Corporation.  
They find that social development policies, including a focus on improving 
education opportunities can weaken local support for terrorist activities.  Cragin 
and Chalk also perform their analysis based on a global dataset and do not delve 
into regional variation in the data.96 
Perhaps the best supported set of arguments for causes of political 
violence comes from research into good governance, democracy, voice and 
                                            
93 Paul Collier, “The Market for Civil War,” Foreign Policy, no. 136 (May–Jun. 2003): 38–45. 
94 Isaac Ehrlich, “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigation,” Journal of Political Economy 81, no. 3 (May–Jun. 1973): 521–565; Richard B. 
Freeman, “Why do so Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and what might we do about 
it?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 25–42. 
95 Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a 
Causal Connection?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 119–144. 
96 Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism and Development (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2003). 
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accountability, and political corruption.  Under this set of theories, there will be a 
higher incidence of political violence when voice and accountability is low, where 
there are high levels of political corruption, and where levels of good governance 
are low.  Democracy comes into play because those who would choose to use 
political violence take into account the likelihood the state would respond with 
repression. In a non-democracy environment, repression is more likely; therefore, 
an individual would be less likely to partake in political violence.  In a democracy, 
there would be a lower likelihood of significant repression—thus a lower 
opportunity cost to the person considering political violence.97  Recent 
scholarship focuses on democracies in transition and finds that significant shifts 
in the type or quality of the state can lead to a significant increase in political 
violence as the status quo is shifting,98 and Fearon and Laitin find no direct 
causal link between democracy and political violence, but do find that political 
instability can lead to conditions that favor insurgency.99 
Economic arguments for the causes of political violence in its various 
forms have been the most pervasive in the literature.100  Collier and Sambanis 
find that recession increases the risk of political violence, and Blomberg and 
Hess find that development leads to a decrease in political violence once 
development is stabilized.101  Interestingly, in another chapter in the same 
volume, Blomberg and Hess find that economic growth is actually associated 
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with higher incidences of terrorism (particularly in states with higher relative 
incomes). 102 Blomberg and Hess do not disaggregate income distribution from 
economic growth here, but there have been few (if any) cases of rapid economic 
growth since the cold war that has occurred in such a way as to improve income 
distribution at the same time.  If income distribution is separated out from 
economic growth then Martha Crenshaw’s argument may hold true that a small 
portion of the “elite take it upon themselves to act on behalf of a majority 
unaware of its plight, unwilling to take action to remedy grievances, or unable to 
express discontent.”103  In other words, taken together, Crenshaw and Blomberg 
and Hess can be seen as an argument that increasing income disparity caused 
by an increase in economic growth can lead to an increase in political violence.  
This runs counter to the classic arguments made by Paul Collier and others at 
the World Bank that economic development leads to greater stability and less 
political violence.104 
Other economic arguments about the causes of political violence include 
unemployment and economic shocks.  The unemployment argument is pretty 
straight forward.  An individual has no productive work to do, has free time, is 
poor due to a lack of income, and thus will commit violence in an effort to 
improve his or her situation.  Djankov and Reynal-Querol find no correlation 
between poverty or unemployment and civil war, and both Crenshaw and Pape 
find no correlation between unemployment and various forms of terrorism.105  On 
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the other hand, Cragin and Chalk find that decreasing unemployment through 
development programs can lead to a decrease in political violence in all forms.106  
All of these studies however, were global in nature and could have missed 
important regional variation leading to one result or another.  Miguel et al. argue 
that it is not unemployment or lack of opportunity that leads to an increase in 
political violence, but rapid shocks to the status quo.  They use an ingenuous 
method of looking for economic shocks through weather patterns in economies 
heavily dependent on agriculture and find that it is these shocks to the economy 
and status quo that lead to a propensity for political violence.107  Similarly, though 
with a less complex research method, Cragin and Chalk find that terrorism 
increases when development policies are implemented in such a way as to shock 
the system without providing for safety nets for those adversely affected by the 
programs.108 
In perhaps the worst-case scenario of political violence and lack of 
economic development, James Piazza examines failed states and their 
propensity for political violence.  Piazza finds a strong link between failed states 
and civil war, but finds no correlation between failed states and terrorism.109  
Stewart Patrick comes to a similar conclusion, and emphasizes the distinction 
between the internal and external threat caused by failed states.  For Patrick, 
“failed states are mainly a threat to their own inhabitants.”  Patrick goes on to 
argue that despite (or because of) this, foreign aid should still be provided to 
encourage development.110  Patrick does not take into consideration the links 
between economic growth and further increases in political violence, however, 
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and his argument for continued aid rings hollow without adequate provisions for 
social safety nets to lower the impact of economic growth on those who are 
harmed by the programs. 
The earliest arguments for a link between development and increased 
political violence came from Samuel Huntington in his Political Order in Changing 
Societies.  Originally published in 1968, Huntington argues that development can 
destabilize society by disrupting traditional social groupings,111 by causing 
increases in inequality,112 and by rapid modernization breading inefficiencies and 
the potential for corruption.113  Huntington’s arguments may have been 
groundbreaking at the time, but parts are severely overstated.  For example, 
Huntington also argues that in the long-run inequality will eventually be lowered 
by growth.114  This has clearly not yet been the case in the developing countries 
as a whole.  Most notably, Serge Lang has also challenged Huntington’s 
methodology.  Lang argues that Huntington’s mathematical models115 are 
inadequate at best and meaningless at worst.116  Thus, parts of the arguments in 
this chapter may parallel Huntington’s work, but all of my assertions are 
empirically tested.  Further, Huntington does not take into account any of the 
positives gained by globalization, considers greater trade only from a growth 
standpoint, and thus only considers the negatives associated with international 
interconnectivity. 
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C. POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA 
Since the end of the civil war in Guatemala in 1996, there have been 2962 
individual recorded incidences of political violence in Latin America, not counting 
the constant suffering in Haiti or the ongoing civil wars in Colombia or Peru.117  
Much of the academic research into the causes of political violence has been 
conducted using the universe of data and has not focused on a region specific 
approach.  Latin America has highly diverse economies, from Chile—a poster 
child for neoliberal economic growth policies, to Haiti—a failed state, so 
economic analysis for the causes of political violence could be beneficial.  
Perhaps the best theory for political violence that actually fits the situation on the 
ground in Latin America comes from Blomberg and Hess.118  They argue simply, 
that economic development can cause political violence.  Latin America makes a 
good region in which to test their argument.  Latin America is geographically 
large; it has a wide cross-state variation of levels of economic growth; and it is 
lacking the ethnic and religious diversity seen in other regions.  Blomberg and 
Hess may be missing some of the intervening variables here however.  This 
chapter looks to show that it is not merely an increase in income that leads to 
greater political violence, but that there are several important intervening 
variables that Blomberg and Hess do not adequately test for, namely: income 
inequality, unemployment, and access to other outlets to air political grievances. 
Increases in income inequality and unemployment frequently go together 
with economic development, particularly when neoliberal economic growth 
strategies are implemented.  Greater income inequality leads to social pressures 
as those who are left behind during the period of economic growth become 
frustrated with their situation.  There are always winners and losers whenever a 
new economic development strategy is implemented, and without adequate 
social safety nets (frequently a deficiency in developing states) there is no means 
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Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database. 
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to provide protection for those who come out on the losing end of the 
development strategy.  These individuals feel they were comparatively better off 
before the strategy was implemented, they may have lost their jobs as a result, 
and they may turn to political violence when there is no suitable alternative to 
better their situation.  In an environment where the individual feels that their 
grievance either cannot, or will not, be addressed by the state, the individual may 
turn to political violence as an alternative method to air their grievances and 
improve their situation. 
D. MODELS, DATA, AND METHODS 
Using the initial framework provided by Blomberg and Hess, but adding 
variables to test for the deductive factors outlined above, and providing additional 
variables to control for those factors deemed most important in the literature, the 
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 (Eqn. 4.2) 
 
 
where: ln(GDP) = The natural  log of PPP GDP per capita in 2005$ 
 ΔGDP = The delta of current GDP per capita and the three year  
 running average 
 Gini = The Gini coefficient 
 Pol4 = The Polity IV score 
 PolDur = The Polity IV score durability (in years) 
 KOF = The KOF Index of Globalization 
 Pop = Population 
 LR = Literacy Rate 
 UR = Unemployment Rate 
 Voice = World Bank Voice and Accountability score 
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2. Hypothesis3 
In Latin America, controlling for sudden economic shocks, levels of 
democracy, population levels, globalization, and democratization—there is an 
increase in incidence of political violence during periods of economic growth, 
high unemployment, greater income inequality, and low levels of voice and 
accountability for the majority of the population. 
3. Data and Methodology 
The models provide a means of testing the hypothesis in the way the data 
is available.  Data for terrorism events is used as a proxy for incidence of political 
violence occurring during a given year.  Data on events of civil war is also 
available and was used to verify the validity of choosing the terrorism data, and 
the findings were similar. Model Violence1 combines all relevant variables 
included in the literature (and deduced in the preceding sections) and provides 
for as robust a testing of the hypothesis as possible.  Model Violence2 was 
inductively generated after the initial round of regressions, and eliminates those 
variables that were not shown to be statistically significant during the first round 
of testing. 
Data for terrorism events come from the University of Maryland’s “Global 
Terrorism Database.”119  The database is widely used by researchers and 
scholars and is professionally maintained by academics. The dataset has reliable 
data after World War II, but data on other variables are only available after 1996.  
This may seem like a hindrance to accurate hypothesis testing, but by selecting 
1996 as the start date for the study in this chapter, influence from other potential 
causes of, and restraints on, political violence can be eliminated.  Specifically, by 
1996, much of the global reverberations from the end of the Cold War were 
dampened, and the civil war in Guatemala was just coming to an end.  Further, 
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there are adequate incidence of terrorism (2962 coded events) between 1996 
and 2008 (when the dataset ends) to sufficiently test the hypothesis using 
regression analysis. 
All economic data, including Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, 
unemployment, and Gini coefficient, come from the World Bank.120  GDP per 
capita data were chosen in 2005 purchasing power parity United States dollars 
for consistency purposes and to account for any fluctuations in exchange rates 
that may skew the data.  The natural log of GDP per capita is used for the 
regressions because the numbers are very large and the natural log gives for a 
more meaningful data point for computational purposes.  Data for the difference 
between GDP per capita and a three-year running average of GDP per capita 
were manually calculated using data from the World Bank.  This additional 
variable provides a means for testing for variations in levels of political violence 
associated with sudden shifts in levels of economic growth.  In other words, 
ΔGDP represents the signed magnitude of any economic shock. Additional 
demographic data also come from the World Bank including both population size 
and literacy rate.  Literacy rate was selected as a proxy for levels of educational 
attainment.  Limitations of the World Bank dataset also led to the elimination of 
both Cuba and Haiti from the dataset.  Economic data for both states is 
nonexistent, inconsistent, or unreliable during the period of study and regretfully 
they had to be removed from the dataset.  This omission could potentially skew 
the results of the regression since both states have limited or negative economic 
growth during the period of study but also experienced several incidences of 
political violence.  
Levels of democratization are controlled for by using scores from the 
Polity IV database.  Additionally, to control for rapid changes in levels of 
governance, the Polity IV Durability score is used.  The Polity IV database 
contains scores on a 21-point scale for each state during the period of study. 
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These scores range from a -10 (hereditary monarchy) to a +10 (consolidated 
democracy).121  The Polity IV database has received some criticism that the 
scores tend to favor leftist regimes over more conservative ones, but the other 
database for measuring democracy, the Freedom House Index, is missing 
several years of data for a few of the states included in the region.122  Therefore, 
to ensure robust testing, the Polity IV database was used. 
To control for an individual’s ability to find an alternate means to address 
their political grievances other than political violence, the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators are used.123  The World Bank ranks Voice and 
Accountability on a scale of +2.5 to -2.5, and the more positive the score, the 
better the state does at providing a public voice to their population and ensuring 
the government is accountable to the populace in the form of free and fair 
elections and legal accountability for corruption.  The World Bank has five 
additional categories it tracks with relation to good governance, but Voice and 
Accountability captures those elements that are shown in the literature to be 
most vital to providing an individual a means to redress their grievances. 
The final data come from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology’s 
KOF124 Index of Globalization.125  This index ranks a state’s globalization along 
the three categories of social, economic, and political globalization.  These three 
categories are then combined together to create the KOF score with a ranking 
between 1 and 100, with a higher score indicating greater levels of globalization.  
If higher levels of globalization provide an additional means for individuals to air 
their political grievances then we should see a negative coefficient in the 
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regression. Remember that the KOF Index includes social and political 
globalization as well as economic, so typical arguments that economic 
globalization may lead to greater incidence of political violence cannot be 
separated from the social arguments that outlets for airing frustrations will reduce 
political violence.  The inclusion of the KOF Index allows for separating the 
positive aspects of globalization (means to air grievances, etc.) from the negative 
aspects directly associated with growth. 
The hypothesis is tested using the data, as presented above, inserted into 
the two models for political violence.  The tests are performed using Minitab16 
statistical software, and results are calculated using Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) Regression Analysis.  Any missing data points are interpolated linearly 
unless they are at the endpoint, in which case they are duplicated from the data 
point immediately to the other side temporally.  The results are presented in 
Table 3 with the coefficient scores presented in the main columns and the T-
Statistic presented in parenthesis just under the coefficient.  Adjusted R2 scores 
are presented in the bottom of each column for each model, and individual 
coefficient statistical significance is represented by using a coded star (*) system.  
One star represents a p-value of less than 0.10 and thus a statistical significance 
at the 90 percent level; two stars represents a p-value of less than 0.05 and thus 
a statistical significance at the 95 percent level; and three stars represents a p-









E. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Variable Violence1 Violence2 
Constant -315.0*** -296.32*** 
 (-3.09) (-3.72) 
Log of GDP per capita (ln(GDP)) 32.91** 26.766*** 
 (2.20) (3.10) 
3 Year ΔGDP per capita (ΔGDP) 0.00213  
 (0.17)  
Gini Coefficient (Gini) 2.5391*** 2.2863*** 
 (2.90) (0.003) 
Polity Four Score (Pol4) -0.0456  
 (-0.09)  
Polity Score Durability (PolDur) 0.6988*** 0.6906*** 
 (4.15) (4.19) 
KOF Index of Globalization (KOF) -1.3404* -1.2444* 
 (-1.79) (-1.75) 
Population (Pop) -0.00000003  
 (-0.30)  
Literacy Rate (LR) -0.4788  
 (-0.62)  
Unemployment (UN) 1.8352** 1.7914** 
 (2.30) (2.46) 
Voice and Accountability (Voice) -29.845*** -30.278* 
 (-3.50) (-3.65) 
Adjusted R
2
 15.0% 16.2% 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01   
Table 10.   Regressions of Political Violence in Latin America on Hypothesized 
Determinates (1996–2008) 
Results of the regressions for the Violence1 model determined that shocks 
to the economy, as captured by the ΔGDP variable, were statistically insignificant 
at predicting either an event of political violence in Latin America.  This runs 
counter to the arguments presented by Miguel et al., but perhaps a better proxy 
for economic shock could have been used to perform the test.  Miguel et al.’s 
approach was unique in that they used weather shocks as a proxy for economic 
shocks in states that are highly dependent on agriculture.  Their methodology 
would not have had universal applicability throughout Latin America, but my 
construct of the ΔGDP variable did contain significant data points of economic 
shocks during the period of study; however, the regressions still showed no 
statistical correlation to political violence.  Economic shocks can thus not be 
considered a significant contributor to political violence in Latin America. 
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Levels of democratization were also not found to be statistically significant 
correlates with political violence.  The Polity IV scores were not statistically 
significant in the Violence1 model tests and were thus eliminated from the 
second run model.  Interestingly, the Polity IV Durability score was statistically 
significant at the 99 percent level in the model and has a positive sign on the 
coefficient.  The regression shows that in Latin America, for every additional year 
a regime type is in place, the number of incidence of violence is likely to go down 
by 0.69.  That means that for every two years a stable model of governance (no 
matter the form) manages to stay in place there will be (on average) one less 
event of violence  This implies that although economic shocks were shown to not 
significantly contribute to political violence, political shocks are likely to have an 
influence. 
Additional factors that were eliminated from the first model, were 
population size and literacy rate.  You will recall that literacy rate was used as a 
proxy for the level of education of the public, and that population size was used 
to control for the influence of population growth on political stability.  Neither was 
shown to be statistically significant.  Population growth was not significant during 
the 12-year duration of this study and its statistical insignificance was not all that 
surprising.  However, it was surprising that levels of education would have no 
influence on levels of political violence.  Perhaps a better proxy could have been 
found for level of education of the population, but literacy rates were the only 
data available for all states during the entire period of study, and even then some 
data had to be interpolated.  Based on this, the influence of levels of education 
on political violence cannot be ruled out conclusively. 
With change in GDP per capita, the Polity IV score, population level, and 
literacy rate eliminated as likely correlates with political violence, a regression 
was then performed using the Violence2 model that leaves them out.  Results for 
this regression does show a slight improvement in the Adjusted R2, but it is clear 
that there is still much missing from these models for robust predicting of political 
violence.  With this in mind, it is important to note that Adjusted R2 values this low 
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are not unusual for this type of modeling and testing, especially when there is no 
way to control for individual psychological effects. 
In both the Violence2 model, the natural log of GDP per capita, the Gini 
coefficient, the unemployment rate, the Polity IV Durability score and the World 
Bank Voice and Accountability score are all statistically significant at the 
95 percent level at a minimum, and most of the variables are significant at the 
99 percent level.  The KOF Index of Globalization score is also statistically 
significant at the 90 percent level.  The Polity IV Durability score was discussed 
earlier as a control variable, and its significance should not be neglected, but 
political stability is not the major focus of this chapter. 
The independent variables that seem to go together should be discussed 
first before turning to the intervening variables.  The natural log of GDP per 
capita, the Gini coefficient for income inequality, and the level of unemployment 
go together, and the results of the regressions are in accordance with the 
arguments presented earlier.  The coefficient on the natural log of GDP per 
capita is positive in the Violence2 model, meaning that as GDP per capita 
increases there is an increase in the likelihood of political violence occurring 
during the year.  The Gini coefficient is a decimal score between 0 and 1 so the 
interpretation of the coefficient in this category is particularly difficult.  However, a 
quick calculation shows that for every decimal level change in the Gini 
coefficient, the likelihood of a terrorism event occurring during any given year 
goes up by .22.  Thus, the larger the income inequality the greater the likelihood 
of a terrorism event occurring.  Interpretation of the coefficient on the level of 
unemployment is more straightforward. 
The coefficient on the unemployment independent variable is positive in 
the Violence2 model.  The data for unemployment was inputted in whole number 
percentages instead of as decimal, so the data interpretation is very clear.  For 
each percentage increase in the rate of unemployment, there would be an 
increase in incidents of political violence of 1.79.  Individual instances of political 
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violence should not cause a significant increase in the unemployment rate, so the 
results of the Violence2 model can be taken as causal in the case of 
unemployment. 
The final two statistically significant variables appear to be intervening 
variables that work to counter the influence of the economic forces on political 
violence.  The World Bank Voice and Accountability score has a negative 
coefficient in the Violence2 model.  Remember that the World Bank Voice and 
Accountability score varies between +2.5 and -2.5.  This makes the interpretation 
of the coefficients on Voice and Accountability that much more powerful.  For a 
one point increase in the Voice and Accountability score there would be 
decrease in the occurrence of events of political violence by 30 in a year.  This is 
with all other variables held constant.  It is clear that an outlet for political 
frustrations and grievance addressing provides a powerful alternative to political 
violence. 
Also statistically significant, but not nearly as powerful, the coefficient on 
the KOF Index of Globalization score is also negative.  For every one-point 
change in the KOF score, there would be one less incidence of political violence 
occurring in the country during a given year.  Remembering that the scale for the 
KOF score is 0 to 100, it becomes clear that globalization (particularly social and 
political globalization) provide some form of meaningful outlet to air political 
grievances and to seek redress for those on the losing side of economic 
globalization.  Remember however, that causation could run in the opposite 
direction here in that a decrease in the level of political violence could lead to an 
increase in globalization as foreign capitalists look to move into markets that 
would now be seen as more stable.  The globalization findings are at least partly 
counter to Huntington’s argument that increased connectivity would lead to 
greater instability (at least initially). 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Economic growth accompanied by an increase in income inequality (as 
measured by the Gini Index) and unemployment have been shown in this chapter 
to lead to a greater incidence of political violence in Latin America.  Significantly, 
and somewhat ironically, the influence of these economic factors can be 
countered by increases in globalization and improvements in the political voice of 
the people and the accountability of government to them.  This chapter goes a 
step further than the work by Blomberg and Hess as it captures the additional 
influence of income inequality and the countervailing forces of globalization.  By 
focusing on one region, much of the generalizability may have been lost; 
however, the explanatory power of the model for Latin America is much greater 
than the models that have come from the more globally focused work.  The 
performance of similar studies in other regions would help to confirm the 
suitability of this approach. 
The findings also confirm many of Huntington’s assertions about the 
destabilization effects that can be associated with rapid growth.  Unlike 
Huntington, however, I systematically and econometrically test all of the variables 
and the prognosis is thus not as dire.  Huntington does not consider the positive 
influences of globalization as potentially offsetting some of the negative 
implications associated with rapid growth.  Further, Huntington provides no 
solution to the problem, offers very few independent variables that can counter 
the negative influences of growth, and is thus an incomplete picture of what is 
really going on in developing countries.  This chapter shows how increasing 
measures that provide for political outlets for dealing with the negative 
externalities can work to (at least partially) offset some of these externalities.  
Finally, Huntington completely ignores social spending as a means to minimize 
the negative influences of growth (increasing inequality), and he thus is missing a 
major tool that can act to lower levels of political violence.  This is perhaps the 
most salient finding of this chapter.  
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The implication of the findings in this chapter is also significant for those in 
the policy world.  To minimize the influence of economic growth on political 
violence, development strategies must be crafted in such a way as to adequately 
compensate those who are negatively impacted by the new strategies.  This 
includes investment in the necessary tax collection infrastructure to extract some 
of the profits from those significantly helped by the development strategies and 
investment in the infrastructure required to provide adequate social safety nets 
for those who are impacted negatively.   The findings on globalization and voice 
also suggest that focused aid in the areas of good governance and 
improvements in the level of civil society may help to offset some of the risk 
associated with economic growth.  Remember that the globalization scores 
include social and political globalization as well as economic—and the 
participation of NGOs and good mentoring by consolidated democracies could be 
of benefit here. 
According to projections from the World Bank’s Center for Poverty 
Reduction and Equity, 11.5 percent of Latin America will still be living on less 
than two dollars a day by 2015.126  The intent of this chapter is not to argue that 
aid programs and development assistance should be reduced or eliminated to 
prevent the associated increase in political violence, in fact quite the opposite.  
This chapter has shown how responsible aid packages and development 
programs can help to alleviate some of the social pressures that lead to the 
increases in political violence seen in the data during periods of economic 
growth.  Much work remains to be done regarding poverty in the region, but by 
promoting a balanced approach and ensuring the windfalls of development are 
distributed more evenly amongst the population; poverty can be reduced while 
minimizing the risk of political violence. 
By analyzing inequality and growth in this chapter as independent 
variables, it is thus impossible to also prove causation in the direction from 
                                            
126 The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects - 2009 (Washington, D.C.: The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2009), 47. 
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growth to inequality, and more significantly, it is extremely difficult to show a 
direct link from the development strategy implemented to an increase in 
inequality.  This presents an interesting topic for future research.  It is often 
assumed (as in this thesis) that growth (specifically through liberalization) 
increases inequality, but the nonexistence of a complete time-series dataset of 
Gini or some other measure of inequality prevents thorough quantitative 
verification of this causal relationship.  Figure 6 provides some preliminary 
evidence that there is a link between liberalization and increased inequality.  The 
graph is a snapshot of current levels of liberalization in a country (approximated 




Figure 6.   Snapshot of Liberalization vs. Inequality in Latin America 
It is clear from Figure 6 that there is a strong positive relationship between 
the level of liberalization in a country and the level of inequality.  Nevertheless, 
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more going on in every case.  For example, Uruguay has a high score on the IEF 
in 2012 at 69.9 and yet the lowest level of Gini in Latin America at 42 percent.  
Similarly, Colombia has a high score on the IEF at 68 and yet their Gini is among 
the highest in Latin America at 58%.  Thus, although a generalization could be 
made that higher levels of liberalization are associated with higher levels of 




V. GETTING THE CLASSIFICATION RIGHT:  DISCRIMINATE 
ANALYSIS ON THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
While Chapter IV demonstrated the importance of social development in 
minimizing the adverse effects of externalities created by economic development 
strategies (particularly liberalization), and Chapter III focused on the role targeted 
social spending had in the implementation of reforms in the first place, this 
chapter brings us back to the recommendations inherent in the findings of 
Chapter II—namely that Latin America can be separated into two subregions that 
will both benefit from a focus on targeted social spending to promote growth, but 
where the other focuses of development programs will look drastically different to 
maximize growth potential.  You will recall that Chapter II made a very basic 
assumption that the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) stages of growth are 
fundamentally correct for Latin America and the Caribbean, and thus the WEF 
stages can be used to divide the region into the two subregions for devising pro-
growth strategies.  Recall also, that the universe of cases was required, rather 
than a Latin American specific approach during the factor analysis in order to 
obtain a large enough N to successfully perform the factor analysis.  This chapter 
drops the assumptions of Chapter II, and looks directly at the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean to evaluate each country’s current stage of 
development and thus ensure that the prescriptions of Chapter II are 
appropriately applied. 
Successfully dividing a region as diverse as Latin America and the 
Caribbean into two subregions according to level of development is not a simple 
task—if you want those subregions to actually be useful and not merely 
conjecture.  The complications are inherent in the definition of development one 
chooses to use.  For example, if you choose to define development in a purely 
economic sense using gross domestic product per capita on a purchasing power 
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parity basis—as many economists do—then you end up viewing the countries 
much as is shown in Figure 7.  You will notice immediately that viewing the 
region in this light would rank Costa Rica, Panama, and Venezuela above 
economic and political powerhouse Brazil.  This is already very different from the 
country stages based on global competitiveness from the WEF that were used in 
Chapter II.  Figure 8 serves as a reminder of where the countries rank out 
according to the WEF stages of development. 
 
 
Figure 7.   GDP per capita by Purchasing Power Parity in Current 


































Figure 8.   World Economic Forum Stage of Development (2011) 
Other potential measures of development only provide added confusion to 
the matter.  Legatum Prosperity Index (LPI)127 and the UN Human Development 
Index (HDI) capture measures of social development well.  However, as 
Figures 9 and 10 show, some countries that are doing well economically, such as 
Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil, do not fare nearly as well when social 
development is factored in.128  This leads to the central question of this chapter—
is there a better way to rank and sort the countries of Latin America that is both 




                                            
127 LPI also captures measure of entrepreneurship as described in Chapter II. 
128 Venezuela and Mexico perform poorly when comparing their LPI score to their level of 
economic development, and Venezuela and Brazil perform poorly when comparing their HDI 










































Figure 9.   Legatum Prosperity Index Overall Prosperity Score (2011) 
 
 















































































B. DATA, HYPOTHESIS, AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Data 
As in previous chapters, the data used come from highly established and 
transparent indices of development and growth potential.  I measure levels of 
economic, political, and social development using The World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI),129 Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom (IEF),130 The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI),131 the Legatum Prosperity Index (LPI),132 and the UN Human 
Development Index (HDI).133  Finally, all economic data come from the World 
Bank.134 
2. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis4:  Although a focus on targeted social spending and social 
development will help all countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, other 
areas of focus will help countries more or less depending on their current level of 
development. 
Hypothesis5:  The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean can be 
divided into two distinct geographic and economic subregions, and separate 
development strategies can be optimized to promote the most growth for each 
subregion at the lowest cost to the government. 
3. Methodology 
I begin with the WEF country stages as a point of departure for study and 
run a discriminate analysis on the Latin American dataset for each of the indices 
                                            
129 Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011. 
130 Miller and Holmes, 2011 Index of Economic Freedom. 
131 The World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
132 Legatum Institute, The 2011 Legatum Prosperity Index. 
133 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2011. 
134 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (1960–2010). 
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of development and growth potential.  This produces two separate sub-
categories of countries for each index as well as a probability score that the 
country is ranked correctly.  Next, I re-perform the factor analysis as described in 
Chapter II, but this time on the Latin American data only.  The sample size is too 
small to then run the factor analysis on subgroupings of the data (hence the 
approach taken using the universe of data in Chapter II), but reducing the 
variables into factors decreases the number of observations enough to make a 
final discriminate analysis possible on the factor scored combination of all the 
indices.  This final discriminate analysis considers economic, political, and social 
development scores for a final ranking of the countries based on the totality of 
the data.  Table 11 shows the results of the discriminate analysis, and Table 12 
lists the results of the factor analysis used to generate the variables for the final 
discriminate analysis. 
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 Group Prob. Group Prob. Group Prob. Group Prob. Group Prob. Group Prob. Group Prob. 
Argentina II 0.976 II 0.903 II 0.636 II 0.972 II 0.893 II 0.977 II 0.906 
Belize I 1.000 I 0.999 I 0.883 I 0.893 I 0.735 I 0.959 I 0.896 
Bolivia I 1.000 I 1.000 I 0.749 I 0.996 I 0.898 I 0.989 I 0.949 
Brazil II 1.000 II 0.997 II 0.627 II 0.831 I 0.602 II 0.549 II 0.765 
Chile II 1.000 II 0.996 II 0.997 II 0.974 II 0.915 II 0.957 II 0.988 
Colombia I 0.999 I 0.604 I 0.514 I 0.859 I 0.661 I 0.749 I 0.593 
Costa Rica I 1.000 I 0.658 II 0.814 II 0.848 II 0.604 II 0.613 II 0.935 
Dominican Rep. I 1.000 I 0.982 I 0.970 I 0.999 I 0.793 I 0.764 I 0.974 
Ecuador I 0.998 I 0.674 I 0.772 I 0.994 I 0.586 I 0.896 I 0.847 
El Salvador I 1.000 I 1.000 I 0.878 I 0.971 I 0.861 I 0.959 I 0.974 
Guatemala I 1.000 I 0.898 I 0.986 I 0.996 I 0.994 I 0.990 I 0.987 
Honduras I 1.000 I 0.989 I 0.940 I 0.996 I 0.968 I 0.994 I 0.988 
Jamaica I 1.000 I 0.984 I 0.780 I 0.999 I 0.531 I 0.918 I 0.937 
Mexico II 1.000 II 0.953 I 0.675 II 0.914 II 0.778 II 0.896 II 0.503 
Nicaragua I 1.000 I 1.000 I 0.976 I 0.993 I 0.990 I 0.997 I 0.997 
Panama I 1.000 I 0.986 I 0.585 II 0.589 II 0.767 II 0.877 II 0.753 
Paraguay I 1.000 I 1.000 I 0.995 II 0.541 I 0.892 I 0.986 I 0.994 
Peru I 1.000 I 0.804 I 0.971 I 0.978 I 0.547 I 0.739 I 0.899 
Uruguay II 1.000 II 0.999 II 0.988 II 0.997 II 0.842 II 0.927 II 0.987 
Venezuela I 1.000 I 0.993 I 0.881 I 0.721 II 0.533 II 0.721 I 0.826 
Notes:  Grouping Method:  IBM SPSS 20.0 Discriminate Analysis.  Results reported are predicted group membership and probability of group 
membership.  Rotated factors for final column were determined via IBM SPSS 20.0 Principle Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation and 
Kaiser Normalization on Latin American cases only (rotation converged in 12 iterations).  WEF = World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Index, IEF = Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom, WB = World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, LPI = 
Legatum Prosperity Index, HDI = United Nations Human Development Index 2011 
Table 11.   Discriminate Analysis on Various Indices of Economic, Political, and Social Development  
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 Main Dimensions 
Key Indicators 
Factor 1 

















       
WB Political Stability / No Violence .898 .091 .094 -.009 -.057 -.021 
WB Control of Corruption .849 .207 .270 .074 .261 .223 
WB Voice and Accountability .832 .190 .192 .300 .204 .049 
LPI Personal Freedom .807 -.143 .196 .255 -.053 .044 
IEF Freedom from Corruption .805 .218 .355 .038 .219 .248 
LPI Safety and Security .804 .126 -.002 .286 -.298 -.038 
WB Rule of Law .797 .251 .359 .205 .240 .162 
LPI Governance .787 .293 .349 .205 .240 .125 
WEF Institutions .763 .307 .410 .048 .201 .172 
IEF Property Rights .619 .456 .392 .203 .331 .164 
WB Government Effectiveness .608 .226 .498 .278 .346 .248 
WEF Health and Primary Education .530 -.271 .084 .319 .227 .414 
IEF Monetary Freedom .113 .881 .051 -.068 .200 .015 
WEF Goods Market Efficiency .339 .842 .342 .040 .079 .044 
IEF Financial Freedom -.136 .827 .238 -.006 .166 .080 
IEF Investment Freedom .389 .780 .170 .238 .202 -.180 
IEF Trade Freedom .354 .728 -.060 -.385 -.016 .224 
IEF Government Spending .035 .719 -.193 .162 -.210 .177 
WB Regulatory Quality .453 .676 .451 .130 .281 .078 
WEF Labor Market Efficiency .370 .595 .306 .040 .487 -.111 
LPI Education .397 -.579 .223 .409 -.055 .413 
IEF Fiscal Freedom .085 .568 -.560 -.112 -.404 .103 
WEF Business Sophistication .246 .313 .844 .139 .063 .109 
WEF Innovation .446 -.066 .793 .140 .061 .159 
WEF Technological Readiness .440 .151 .697 .414 -.092 .105 
WEF Financial Market Development .082 .660 .669 .078 .003 -.087 
WEF Infrastructure .410 .272 .657 .217 .113 .243 
WEF Higher Education and Training .495 -.342 .593 .318 .117 .287 
LPI Social Capital .194 .072 .177 .806 -.030 -.118 
LPI Health .475 -.042 .173 .697 .121 -.006 
LPI Entrepreneurship & Opportunity .449 .019 .530 .622 .137 .029 
Human Development Index .437 -.245 .275 .614 .098 .364 
IEF Business Freedom -.169 .432 .098 .586 .526 .087 
IEF Labor Freedom .374 .212 .028 .077 .855 -.046 
WEF Macroeconomic Environment .096 .157 .106 -.180 -.007 .923 
LPI Economy .298 .150 .413 .274 -.140 .581 
       Notes:  Extraction Method:  IBM SPSS 20.0 Principle Component Analysis.  Rotation Method Variamax with Kaiser Normalization.  Rotation converged in 12 iterations.  WEF = World Economic Forum Data 
Set, IEF = Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom Data Set, WB = World Bank Governance Data Set, LPI = Legatum Prosperity Index Data Set, Human Development Index:  United Nations 
Human Development Index 2011 
Table 12.   Factor Analysis (Dimension Reduction) on Latin American and Caribbean Countries 
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Discriminate analysis on WEF GCI gives the expected results as shown in 
Table 11.  The countries divide out into two subregions as originally described 
based upon their WEF stage of development and as was the central assumption 
in Chapter II.  The probabilities that the countries are correctly classified are 
greater than 97 percent in every case, and most cases have a 100 percent 
probability of being correct.  This follows the original assumption of using the 
WEF stage of development to sub-divide Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Further, when only Heritage Foundation IEF scores are considered, the countries 
break out into similar groupings, although Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador 
have relatively low probabilities of correct classification according to IEF scores 
and can nearly be grouped with the more developed countries in Subregion II. 
Based solely on WB WGI scores, Costa Rica moves up into Subregion II, 
and Mexico shifts down to Subregion I.  Further, Panama and Colombia appear 
to be very close to shifting into Subregion II based on the low probability of their 
correct classification in this category.  The limitation of the WB WGI scores to 
looking solely at measures of good governance provides a much focused area 
for these countries to improve to aid in shifting to the next stage of development. 
Recalling that the LPI includes more measures of social development and 
entrepreneurship than the other indices, and the results of the discriminate 
analysis on this index are particularly illustrative.  Costa Rica, Panama, and 
Paraguay move into Subregion II based on the results of the discriminate 
analysis, although Panama and Paraguay have relatively low probabilities of 
correct classification, and thus still have work to do along these dimensions.  The 
fact that Paraguay is on the verge of breaking through is the most surprising of 
the results based on the LPI discriminate analysis.  Paraguay has one of the 
lowest GDP per capita among the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and has been plagued with chronic underperformance.  It appears as though 
Paraguay’s scores on Personal Freedom, Social Capital, and Health are 
providing enough offset for their negative scores in Education, Entrepreneurship, 
and Governance to place them just barely in Subregion II.  Based upon their 
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highly negative scores in these other areas however, it is clear Paraguay has 
much more work to do to move into the next stage of development. 
Interestingly, taking only into account the social development factors 
included in the UN HDI and Brazil falls out of inclusion with the most developed 
countries.  Further, as would be expected based upon their relatively high levels 
of social spending, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama move up into Subregion 
II.  These countries still have much work to do as well, and Venezuela and Costa 
Rica have relatively low probabilities of proper classification.  In fact, with a 
probability of proper classification at 53.3 percent, Venezuela is nearly just as 
likely to be classified with the Subregion I countries.  Further, these results show 
that although Brazil is an economic powerhouse, they are underperforming their 
regional economic peers when it comes to social development. 
One of the arguments against using all of these complicated indices to 
measure development and growth potential is that oftentimes GDP per capita is 
highly correlated with the results.  This would imply that simply using readily 
available GDP per capita data could provide nearly as much information and 
predictive power as the indices do.  A comparison of the results of the 
discriminate analysis on the GDP per capita (PPP) data with the results from the 
other indices illustrates why more than economic data is needed.  First, using 
GDP per capita for the discriminate analysis places Venezuela into Subregion II 
again.  This is contrary to every other possible way of measuring development 
and growth potential with the slight exception of the HDI discussed above.  
Further, a large country like Brazil loses any influence due to market size and 
efficiencies of scale and has a very low probability of being classified correctly in 
Subregion II.  Clearly, solely using economic data such as GDP per capita can 
provide an incomplete picture of a country’s state of development and growth 
potential. 
What do all of the contradictory results of the discriminate analysis on the 
individual indices really tell us?  First, they tell us that something more is needed 
to provide the larger picture when considering where a country is actually located 
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along the development spectrum.  Second, comparisons between the results of 
the separate indices can shed some light on which areas individual countries 
need to focus on apart from those areas prescribed in Chapter II.  Finally, the 
results remind us to always take into account the particular focus of a given 
groups’ index and to look deeper to ensure their prescriptions are placed within 
the proper context. 
The results of the discriminate analysis on the variables generated 
through the factor analysis reported in Table 12 may provide, or at least point us 
in the general direction of, the “something more” than can answer all of the 
concerns raised about the results of the individual index discriminate analyses.  
Through the factor analysis of my Latin American combined dataset, I reduce the 
various scores across the multitude of indices included down to just six 
independent factors that capture the variation within and across the indices.  The 
results of the discriminate analysis on these factors provide us with a useful 
division of the countries into subregions that takes into account all of the 
dimensions included in the combined dataset. 
Not surprisingly, Costa Rica and Panama move up to Subregion II under 
the final discriminate analysis.  This follows the results of the individual 
discriminate analysis on the LPI, and HDI for Panama, and the LPI, HDI, and 
World Bank WGI for Costa Rica.  Panama and Costa Rica both have the 
advantage of the large market associated with free trade agreements with the 
United States,135 and clearly Costa Rica has among the best governance in the 
region.  Panama still has work to do concerning governance, but they have made 
great progress recently in social development,136 and this appears to provide the 
impetus for moving them into Subregion II. 
                                            
135 Costa Rica is covered by CAFTA-DR:  Dominican Republic-Central America-United 
States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Public Law 109–53, (2005).  Panama is 
covered by the Panama Trade Promotion Agreement:  United States-Panama Trade Promotion 
Agreement Implementation Act, Public Law 112–43 (2011). 
136 Legatum Institute, The 2011 Legatum Prosperity Index; United Nations Development 
Programme, Human Development Report 2011. 
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Mexico provides the greatest surprise in results of the final discriminate 
analysis, but as in the case of Panama and Costa Rica, the individual 
discriminate analyses can provide specific targets for improvement.  Mexico is 
still ranked as a Subregion II country, but their probability of correct placement is 
very low at 50.3 percent.  Thus, statistically, Mexico is barely less likely to be 
classified as a Subregion I country than as a Subregion II country.  The results of 
the individual discriminate analysis on WB WGI points to specific areas for 
Mexico to address, such as control of corruption, political stability, and general 
rule of law.  Mexico may be teetering on the brink of sliding to a Subregion I 
country, but recent reforms in the political arena are heading in the right direction, 
and the likely shift away from the war on drugs after the upcoming elections may 
help with the control of corruption and the rule of law as it applies to citizen’s 
rights. 
D. CONCLUSION 
It is important to point out that the countries as divided into subregions and 
shown in Figure 11 only differ slightly from the original division according to the 
WEF stage of development seen in Figure 1 of Chapter II (Panama and Costa 
Rica).  It is also significant that the vast majority of countries were ranked within 
the same subregion across all of the discriminate analyses.137  In the cases 
where the country’s subregion was correctly identified consistently, then the 
policy prescriptions of Chapter II can provide a great deal of insight into where 
countries can best target development programs.  However, the results of the 
individual discriminate analyses can also provide additional guidance—
particularly when a country’s probability of being divided correctly is relatively 
low.  In other words, Chapter II shows areas most closely aligned with growth 
 
 
                                            
137 Specifically, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay were consistently ranked in Subregion II, and 
Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Peru were consistently ranked in Subregion I. 
 87 
within a subregion, and this chapter illuminates areas to focus on for moving from 
Subregion I to Subregion II (or areas where improvement is needed to prevent 
sliding into the lower subregion). 
 
 
Figure 11.   Latin America and the Caribbean by Subregion Based on a  
Discriminate Analysis of the Combined Factor Scores 
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Interestingly, and central to the arguments made in the rest of this thesis, 
social development appears to have played a dominant role in moving Panama 
and Costa Rica into Subregion II.  Their high scores in the LPI and HDI (both 
heavily weighted in measures of social development) played a dominant role in 
allowing Panama and Costa Rica to move up into the group of most developed 
countries in Latin America (Subregion II).  Thus, social development is shown to 
not only play a role in development within a subregion as in Chapter II, but is also 
shown to help a country move from one stage of development to the next.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECCOMENDATIONS, AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The central argument of this thesis has been that Social Development and 
targeted social spending played an active role in the implementation and 
acceptances of economic reforms in the past, but they also promote growth by 
increasing the productive capacity of the population.  Further, social development 
can act to offset the proclivity of development to increase instability and levels of 
political violence.  This ability of social development to promote stability and 
growth and also encourage the acceptance of structural adjustment programs 
demonstrates the fallacy of the Washington Consensus demand that a country 
must lower their fiscal burden for growth to happen. 
Chapter I provided a basic overview of the Washington Consensus and its 
proponents, while Chapter II performed a varimax rotated factor analysis to 
determine those factors that are most closely aligned with growth potential in 
both Latin American subregions.  For the countries of Subregion I, the results 
show the pro-growth benefits of a strategy that focuses on social development 
through targeted social spending on education and health programs—thus 
increasing worker productivity.  On the other hand, the countries of Subregion II 
achieve pro-growth benefits by focusing on strategies that improve 
entrepreneurship first and higher levels of social development (such as higher 
education and specialized training) second.  There are of course other areas that 
are closely aligned with growth potential, but these factors are the most closely 
aligned and also happen to be the least politically contentious. 
Chapter III found that both democracies and authoritarian governments 
used targeted social spending in the past to reduce the political costs of 
structural adjustment programs, and democracies were better able to negotiate 
with their populations and thus enacted farther-reaching reforms.  The most 
important finding of Chapter III was that targeted social spending and an increase 
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in social safety nets can serve to ease the implementation of economic reforms 
and work to strengthen democratic negotiation and governance. 
Chapter IV found a strong correlation between economic development and 
levels of political violence in Latin America, but also found a potential solution in 
social development.  Where levels of inequality rose there was a corresponding 
increase in political violence, but programs that focus on social development can 
work to counter the potential for increased violence.  I also find a positive role for 
globalization as a means for the airing of political grievances to minimize the risk 
of political violence.  This finding runs counter to the arguments that globalization 
in and of itself is destabilizing.  Political violence and instability are clearly 
normative negatives, but growth and development are required for a society to 
maximize its potential and improve the lives of its citizens.  Social development 
works to mitigate the risks of political violence and instability by compensating 
those who do not receive the maximum benefit of development or are harmed by 
it.  Governments must possess adequate capacity to tax those who benefit the 
most from growth to provide the social safety nets and social development 
programs required to mitigate the risk of increased political violence, and where 
that capacity does not exist it must be built. 
Finally, Chapter V challenged the country stage of growth classifications of 
the World Economic Forum and performed a discriminate analysis to determine 
the appropriate subregion membership for each Latin American country.  The 
results of this analysis provided targeted strategies for borderline countries to 
move to the next stage of growth and reclassified Panama and Costa Rica as 
Subregion II countries.  Social development played a role here as well, as the 
countries that were able to transition to the higher subregion did so primarily 
through increased levels of social development.  The other important factor for 
encouraging transition to the next stage of growth appears to be improving 
internal levels of governance.  All the infrastructure and markets in the world are 
useless unless there is adequate governance to manage them effectively. 
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Scholars have understudied the role of social development, social safety 
nets, and social spending in promoting growth, and the Washington Consensus 
misinterpreted it as a waste of government resources.  This thesis challenges 
this core assumption of the original Washington Consensus, not on political 
grounds as is usual, but on purely economic grounds.  This thesis has shown 
that social development lessens the risk of political violence and eases the 
political costs of structural adjustment policies.  Further, I have demonstrated 
through rigorous statistical analysis the pro-growth influence social development 
can have in building a stronger and more competitive workforce.  Finally, social 
development plays a role in not only promoting growth based on a county’s 
current stage of growth, but it also aids in putting the conditions in place 
necessary to move into the next stage of growth altogether. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Database Updates 
Several of the databases used in this thesis are out of date and will 
require updating to remain relevant.  For example, the Escaith and Paunovic 
database on liberalization, vital to the time series analysis performed in Chapter 
III, only has valid data through 2000.  Escaith and Paunovic’s database was an 
update on an earlier database by Morley et al., and it is time for an update to take 
the database through at least 2010.  The methodology provided by Morley et al., 
and improved by Escaith and Paunovic, is sound, and an update to the database 
would allow for additional hypothesis testing using liberalization as both an 
independent and dependent variable. 
Other databases used in this thesis are not necessarily out of date but 
neglect certain countries whose inclusion would provide for more robust 
hypothesis testing.  For example, nearly every database excludes Cuba and 
Haiti.  Cuba is excluded due to the lack of reporting of key economic statistics 
and the unreliability of the numbers they do report, and Haiti has been excluded 
recently due to the lack of infrastructure available to collect and disseminate data 
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after the political turmoil of 2004 and the subsequent earthquake of 2010.  
Nevertheless, for Haiti, it is vital to have a good set of data with which to base 
recommendations for reestablishing growth and stability.  The World Bank has 
the resources and expertise to help measure the indicators, and the United 
Nations should make accurate economic data gathering a major component of 
their mission.  Until the breadth of the problem is fully understood, adequate 
solutions are unlikely to emerge. 
Cuba, on the other hand, has the resources and expertise to measure and 
manage their own economic data, but hostile economic policies from the United 
States make the release of accurate data untenable for the near future.  The 
lessening of restrictions on the travel ban in 2011, and a renewed focus on 
cultural exchange between the two countries are steps in the right direction.  The 
Cuban people should benefit greatly from increased access to the world market, 
but accurate economic data and some kind of guarantee against nationalization 
will likely be required before foreign direct investment (FDI) will return in droves.  
Cuba no longer represents any real threat to the United States militarily, and 
unilateral action on the part of the United States to normalize relations with Cuba 
would put the onus on them to open the national books and reenter the 
international economy. 
Another database in need of updating is the World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI).  This dataset is highly useful in quantitative 
research and has been updated regularly since its creation in 1996.  
Unfortunately, the World Bank has not opted to look back at the years prior to 
1996 and release data for those years.  This would be a difficult and time-
consuming undertaking, nevertheless, the value to quantitative research on 
periods before 1996 would be enormous.  The World Bank publicizes their 
methodology; and even if they do not have the resources to gather the data for 
the years preceding 1996, independent researchers should be able to follow their 
approach and produce a viable database. 
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Finally, and most important, there is currently no single database of 
income inequality that can be utilized for time-series research.  The Gini Index 
data from the World Bank is good when it is available, but it is very inconsistent 
in the choice of years where the data was gathered and calculations performed.  
The results are snapshots of data that do not overlap across countries and time.  
This leads to an overall inability to perform viable quantitative studies using 
income inequality as either an independent or dependent variable.  The 
workarounds to the currently available data include interpolation and 
estimation—each with their own drawbacks.  Inequality is too important and 
politically sensitive of a topic for unreliable and incomplete data to be used as the 
basis of debate. 
2. Further Study 
The conclusion of Chapter IV provided the outline for a future research 
project into the effect of liberalization on income inequality in Latin America.  I 
just outlined the problems with inequality data in general, but a qualitative 
longitudinal study of the process of liberalization and the impact on income 
inequality should be possible to construct using currently available data and in 
country research.  This qualitative research could then be backed up and second 
checked by snapshot quantitative analysis on the inequality and liberalization 
data when it is available.  The combination of the two methodologies should 
allow for a more complete answer to the liberalization and inequality question 
than is currently available. 
In addition to a need for supplementary inequality research, the findings of 
this thesis should prompt a similar systematic approach to other developing 
regions.  For example, Africa is another region where a one-size-fits-all approach 
to development has been tried with varying levels of success and where a 
geographic division of growth stage has emerged (coastal vs. non-coastal).  The 
factor analysis approach of Chapter II and the discriminate analysis approach of 
Chapter V should provide a good foundation for research on improving 
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development programs there.  This is not to argue that the potential solutions 
would be identical (they likely differ significantly), but the methodologies 
employed in this thesis should be valid regardless of the region in which they are 
applied. 
Finally, the development suggestions derived from Chapters II and V are 
only as good as the present data.  That means a process of reevaluation and 
revision will be necessary to ensure the policy recommendations remain current 
and valid.  The effects of each new program will likely alter the data and the 
subsequent results, but the methodology allows for a reappraisal of the situation 
and policy adjustment as necessary.  This becomes even more important as a 
country nears the next stage of growth.  Managing the transition to the next stage 
can be extremely difficult for any country, but using the framework provided in 
this thesis to evaluate the options can help streamline the process. 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
1. Implications for the United States and other Wealthy Countries 
The United States, in particular, has a vital interest in promoting 
development and minimizing instability in Latin America.  In the current 
globalized world, instability (especially in the Western Hemisphere) undermines 
markets and threatens economic prosperity.  Chapter IV outlined the link 
between economic growth and political violence, and it demonstrated how 
minimizing income inequality and unemployment could help to mitigate the 
threat.  Thus, the United States and the rest of the world are placed in the 
situation of trying to determine how to encourage development while 
discouraging the associated increase in political violence.  It becomes clear that 
the encouragement of low government spending associated with the original 
Washington Consensus is counterproductive, and targeted social spending can 
be used to address many of these issues. 
Additionally, the United States and international development 
organizations have done little to encourage acceptance of recommendations by 
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packaging them as a one-size-fits-all approach and forcing them on developing 
countries.  Calling the approach the “Washington Consensus” further damages 
the credibility of the programs in a region where the imperial intentions of the 
north are always in question.  The United States and our wealthy international 
partners need to empower the developing countries by building a partnership 
approach to development that provides recommendations not impositions.  
Listening to the genuine political concerns of the developing countries will allow 
for a realistic approach to policy implementation, and utilizing the 
recommendations of Chapters II and V should provide a basis from which to build 
development strategies that are less contentious in the first place. 
Apart from the multitude of other reasons why democracy is a normative 
good for Latin America, the findings of Chapter III reiterate the fact that 
democracies also are better able to implement economic reforms when needed.  
For the United States and the United Nations, this means that support of pro-
democracy initiatives should continue to be encouraged in Latin America, and 
countries that have recently transitioned, or are in the process of transitioning, 
should be encouraged and aided in the process by the international community 
where possible.  As Chapter II implies, democracies in transition are less stable 
than any other type of regime that has been in place for a significant period, but 
the ability of democratic regimes to negotiate through economic reforms cannot 
be understated.  Thus, continued democratization and democracy should be 
encouraged where possible. 
2. Implications for Latin America 
Social spending on education and health care build the productive base of 
a society and over time erode the factors leading to increases in income 
inequality.  Additionally, Chapter III showed how social spending can be used to 
offset some of the negative externalities associated with a structural adjustment 
program.  Latin American countries should only undertake in development 
programs after assessing the negative externalities associated with them and 
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building in a program to address those externalities.  Countries should not 
undertake development programs just for development’s sake but with a real 
purpose to improve the lives of the people.   
For the least developed countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
(those countries in Subregion I), the results of Chapter II imply a focus on social 
development first then entrepreneurship.  This runs counter to the general 
Washington Consensus ideas that less government spending is better and that 
decreasing a country’s fiscal obligations is the only way to get growth started.  In 
the case of the countries in Subregion I, this appears not to be the case.  For the 
more developed countries in Latin American Subregion II on the other hand, 
growth potential is most closely aligned with innovation and competitiveness first, 
then higher levels of social development.  Training programs that both increase 
the level of entrepreneurship and higher education of the population would 
provide stimulus along several dimensions that are closely related with growth 
potential and may provide the most influence for the money spent. 
Countries that are ready to transition to the next stage of development 
have additional areas of improvement to focus on before the transition can occur.  
Chapter V illustrates where the countries in transition should focus, but a few 
examples illustrate the point.  Mexico needs to focus on governance reforms to 
solidify its place as a Subregion II country, and Colombia must concentrate on 
governance reforms in order to begin the transition to the next stage of growth.  
Panama and Costa Rica meet the prerequisites to transition to the next stage, 
and despite the improper classification by the WEF, both countries will benefit 
from a concentration on the items prescribed for Subregion II. 
The final recommendation for the countries of Latin America is to learn 
from the lessons of the past, but not to use past failures as an excuse either.  
The Washington Consensus did not sustainably meet its stated purpose, but that 
does not mean that the United States, the IMF, and the World Bank 
recommended it with malicious intent.  The developed world still has much to 
offer in terms of resources and aid to support growth in Latin America.  Refusing 
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help because of past failures would dramatically limit the strategy options 
available.  This thesis has shown that there are several potential strategies for 
growth that are less politically contentious than the Washington Consensus and 
would lead to lower income inequality over the long run.  The countries of Latin 
America should insist on bilateral development strategies, but not reject offers of 
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